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Abstract
This paper analyses 2 005 mergers and acquisitions in the period from 2000 to
2012 in order to investigate merger arbitrage excess return. Merger arbitrage is
an investment strategy that takes advantage of the difference between the share
price and the offer price of a target share after the announcement of a merger or
an acquisition bid. The analysis is based on a methodology of creating merger
arbitrage portfolios to realistically replicate the returns possible to achieve
for merger arbitrage professionals. To test the significance of the results, the
returns are tested with the linear regression models CAPM and Fama-French.
Finally, the paper also investigates the notion that a piecewise linear model
might be a better tool for performance measurement of merger arbitrage.
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Part I
Introduction
This paper aims to provide some new insight into the subject of merger ar-
bitrage. Specifically, it will be a new and updated look on the excess return
generated from merger arbitrage in the period of 2000 to 2012 for the U.S
market. To the best of the authors knowledge there have not been any peer-
reviewed studies into this subject to analyze the recent decennial period. The
paper walks a well trotted path laid down by former studies on merger ar-
bitrage and has drawn much on the works of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)
and Baker and Savasoglu (2002). The authors are still hopeful in all modesty
that the paper might have some value, both as an introductory guide into the
subject matter and as an update for the research field.
Merger arbitrage is an investment strategy that takes advantage of the
difference between the share price and the offer price of a target share after
the announcement of a merger or an acquisition bid. The share price will react
to a takeover bid by nearing the bid offer, but because of deal completion risk
there remains a small premium in the share price called the arbitrage spread.
The practitioners of this trade are the arbitrageurs who take positions after a
takeover announcement to harvest the arbitrage spread. Merger arbitrage is
not like classical arbitrage in the sense of the absolute risk free trade of similar
assets at different prices, it does entail the risk that the merger fails and share
price falling to pre-announcement levels.
This paper follows the methodology of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) in a time-series analysis of the returns given by
merger arbitrage. These studies found U.S. annual merger arbitrage returns
respectively in the scale of 4 % to 11% above the market index when uti-
lizing linear regression models such as CAPM and Fama-French. The basic
premise of the method is to construct “passive” merger arbitrage portfolios
and compare the performance of these against the market. The term “Passive
Portfolio” entails that all the M%A events are included; there is no selection
or picking of events.
The first part of this paper is a comprehensive discussion around the
topic of merger arbitrage. Major concepts, different deal types, the risks in-
volved, a brief history of the market for M&A in the U.S., and a run-through of
the efficient market hypothesis. Then follows a review of the major academic
work on the subject of excess return and a summary of the results from the
field. The first part ends with a discussion on why there exists excess returns
and how that might be connected to the role of the arbitrageur. The next
part of the paper is the data and research methodology section, all aspects of
the data gathering and portfolio construction is then accounted for. The last
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part of the paper details the time-series analysis of the merger arbitrage re-
turns, which is divided into three major sections. Section one is an analysis of
the overall return and risk characteristics of merger arbitrage portfolios. Sec-
tion two benchmarks the portfolio return against linear asset pricing models.
Section three investigates the possibility of a piecewise linear function.
The results of the paper partially confirm the work of previous research
on this field for the new millennium. Using a sample of 2 005 completed or
attempted takeover deals in the U.S market from the period 2000 to 2012 a
merger arbitrage strategy is able to generate some excess return. All the con-
structed portfolios achieve higher Sharpe ratios than the market index. 3 out
of 4 portfolios are able to generate excess return (alpha) when benchmarked
against the CAPM and Fama-French factor models. However, not all the al-
pha values are statistically significant within a 10% limit. The final research
section of the paper investigating a piecewise linear relationship is not able to
neither confirm nor falsify such a relationship for the sample period.
Although not all of the research present the statistical significance needed
to constitute evidence the paper still invites the notion of excess return. That
is in itself an achievement for an investment strategy in the age of efficient
microsecond global financial trade.
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Part II
Merger Arbitrage
These first two parts provides a discussion on merger arbitrage. The first
part describes the concept of merger arbitrage and its basis as an investment
strategy. It provides a run-down of the basic concepts of merger arbitrage, the
different deal types, the general market for mergers and acquisitions, and the
risks of merger arbitrage. The second part is a review of the academic evidence
on excess returns from merger arbitrage and the reasons for this premium.
1 Merger Arbitrage as an Investment Strategy
On February 9th 2012 a takeover is announced on the Bloomberg news service.
Oracle Corporation (ORCL) is one of the largest suppliers of business software
in the world and they have entered into an acquisition agreement with the
public software company Taleo Corporation (TLEO). Oracle has offered to
buy out all the Taleo shareholders with a cash bid of $46 per share, valuing the
entire acquisition at about $1.9 billion for the entire company. This is Oracles
second acquisition in the last three months and industry experts believe Oracle
is doing this to position itself in the emerging area of “Cloud Computing”.
Almost instantly after the acquisition is publicized there is a big jump in Taleo
share price, in a matter of minutes the share price has increased about 17%
from about $39 per share to a new trading price at $45.64. The daily trading
volumes of this share has never been as high as the day of this announcement.
For the next two months the share price stabilizes at about $45.5 before Taleo
is delisted in a successful tender offer on April 5th.
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Figure 1: Taleo Stock Price & Volume During Takeover
Taleo stock price “jumps” immediately after takeover announcement
This acquisition was a success for both Oracle and the existing Taleo
shareholders, but there was another group of investors who also benefited from
this deal. The arbitrageurs who bought into Taleo stock on February 9th af-
ter the deal was announced were able to buy Taleo stock for $45.5 and two
months later sell the shares for $46 to Oracle. The return from this two month
investment was about 1.10%; not as impressive as the 18% premium for the
existing shareholders but still an annualized return of about 7%. There is on
average several hundred transactions like this every year in the U.S. financial
markets, making traders who practice this kind of Merger Arbitrage very suc-
cessful.Merger arbitrage is an investment strategy that takes advantage of the
difference between the share price and the offer price of a target stock after
the announcement of a merger or an acquisition bid.
It is important to differentiate between normal merger and acquisition
(M&A) activity and merger arbitrage. M&A activity is everything that goes
into the restructuring of businesses; the management of deals, the financial
structures, the legal processes, the takeover tactics, the practical implications
for workers, the negotiations, the valuations, the tax issues and all the other
processes involved with merging or acquiring businesses. The reasons for and
the practice of M&A is a huge area of business and academia, and it is global
in its scope. Jensen (1988) include the following factors that might motivate
takeover activity: deregulation, synergies, economies of scale, taxes, manage-
rial improvement, increasing globalization and agency costs related to cash
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flow payout for shareholders.
Merger Arbitrage on the other hand is a bit more limited in definition;
it is the speculation in stocks belonging to the parties that is undergoing
an M&A process. It can then be seen as an exogenous effect of M&A, rather
than an integral part of such transactions. This however, does not diminish its
importance. When a company decides to perform an M&A transaction it will
have to pay a premium above the current market price, if not the shareholders
will earn a greater return by just selling at the prevailing market price. The
price an acquirer pay above the prevailing market price ,pre-announcement
share price, is the takeover premium.
Figure 2: Takeover Premium & Arbitrage Spread
The takeover premium is the difference between pre-announcement stock price and bid
price, while the arbitrage spread is the difference between post-announcement stock price
and share price
When an announcement is made the target shares will instantly jump to
a level close to, but usually not exactly to, the offer price. Due to uncertainty
regarding the ultimate success of the takeover, uncertainties that will be duti-
fully explained further on in this paper, there is a risk of deal failure. This is
why there is a difference between the initial offer price and post-announcement
stock price. The difference between what the stock price jumps to, the post-
announcement share price, and what the acquirer has proposed to pay for the
target stock is called the arbitrage spread.
The size of this spread depends on the probability of success for the
deal. It tends to diminish with time left to complete the deal and with posi-
tive signals from shareholders and regulators. Figure 3 is very revealing about
the nature of the arbitrage spread.1 The successful deals displays an arbi-
1Figure 3 is copied from Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)
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trage spread that steadily shrinks as resolution nears, while the unsuccessful
deals swerve a lot higher from the offset, bearing a higher risk premium, and
skyrockets from the second it is known that the deal will fail.
Figure 3: Arbitrage Spread & Time to Deal Resolution
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)
Merger arbitrage is a bet about whether a transaction will be successful.
The group of traders and investors who uses merger arbitrage as an invest-
ment strategy is called arbitrageurs. Arbitrageurs can be financial institutions,
hedge funds, banks or specialists that create portfolios of stocks that are un-
dergoing takeovers. Arbitrageurs have played an important part in many of
the great success stories from capital markets. They have also been involved
in some of business historys most epic collapses and failures.
Much anecdotal material exists on the subject of merger arbitrage, such
as the quintessential character Ivan Boesky who truly embodied both the
successes and downfalls. The biggest merger arbitrageur in the 1980s and was
at his peak responsible for trading a fund worth $3 billion USD and he served as
the inspiration for Gordon Gecko in Oliver Stones Wall Street with his famous
speech about how “Greed is good”. He was able to achieve superior profits
and make his investors rich, but it turned out that he did so by using insider
information. In 1986 he was arrested for buying insider information from
several different brokerage firms, and in the process almost singlehandedly
ending the leveraged buyout era of the 1980s. He went from being among
the Forbes 400 wealthiest people to serving time in jail and paying a $100
million fine to the people he had swindled and forever being known as “Ivan
the terrible”.2
It is very doubtful whether most merger arbitrageurs lead as exciting
2http://www.businessinsider.com/meet-ivan-boesky-the-infamous-wall-streeter-who-
inspired-gordon-gecko-2012-7?op=1
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lives as Ivan Boesky, but there is no doubt that they play a very important
part in the world of Merger and Acquisitions. The arbitrageurs take the risks
other investors do not want using supposedly superior industry knowledge,
having a better insight into the bet that the merger will be successful.
Several cross-sectional studies have been done into what makes a merger
or an acquisition successful. First of all, most deals end up being a success.
Branch and Yang (2010) note success rates of above 80% for both stock and
cash offers. This is a fairly high percentage of successful mergers and it follows
that M&A deals are very important processes for any company and is always
the result of thorough due-diligence and analysis. However, deals can fail
and for arbitrageurs it is of paramount importance to grasp the factors that
contribute to success.
Branch and Yang (2010) further investigates the variables that have
an impact on merger arbitrage returns and find that the takeover premium,
payment method and deal type are all correlated with higher returns and
higher probability of success. A higher takeover premium increases the success
rate; this result is also confirmed by Hsieh and Walkling (2004). When cash
is the transaction consideration it is more likely to be successful than in stock
transactions. Other studies point to further factors that increase the possibility
of takeover success; Jindra and Walkling (2002) finds that for cash tender offers
in the period 1981 to 1995 the most important variables for successful deals
were positive target management attitude (no hostile takeovers), low offer
duration and a large arbitrage spread. This paper goes on to suggest that a
large arbitrage spread attracts arbitrageurs which in turn help the takeover
process.
The notion that arbitrageurs and arbitrage capital help facilitate takeovers
have been further investigated Baker and Savasoglu (2002) and Hsieh and
Walkling (2004). They find that increases in arbitrage capital improve prob-
ability of deal success, implying the importance of merger arbitrage activity
for the takeover markets. Further variables include debt-to-equity ratio where
Harris and Raviv (1988) find a correlation between the leverage of a target
firm and probability of success, higher leveraged firms are harder to buy out
for an acquirer. It has also been found by Branch et al. (2003) that smaller
firms with lower equity value have a higher probability of success than larger
firms.
1.1 M&A deal types
There are several different methods of acquiring a target company, and hence
there are several different ways of achieving merger arbitrage. The most com-
mon deal types are either cash offers or stock offers.
Cash offers: The cash consideration offer is the simplest form of a
takeover bid. The acquirer announces that they want to buy out a target
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company and its shareholders, to do that they simply provide a cash offer. An
arbitrageur will in that case take long positions, buy stock, in the target com-
pany and bet that the deal will be successful. The arbitrageur profit is in that
case the arbitrage spread between the stock price at the time of announcement
and the offer price if the deal goes through.
Stock offers: In this case the acquiring company will offer its own shares
in exchange for target shares. In this case an arbitrageur will buy target
stock, as in a cash offer. But there is also a short position, borrowing to
sell, in the acquirer stock. An arbitrageur does this because when the deal
is successful he receives in return for the target share the promised number
of acquirer shares, which is used to cover the short position. The profit for
the arbitrageur will be the combination of the increasing target price and the
possibly falling acquirer stock. The exchange ratio can be fixed, but it can
also be floating depending on the acquirer stock price. A collar transaction is
a version of the stock offer with an exchange ratio interval for acquirer stock
instead of a fixed ratio. The dollar value of the deal is instead fixed for a given
range of acquirer stock price. About 20% of stock swap takeovers are collar
transactions (Officer (2006)). Branch and Wang (2008) did a time-series study
on collar transactions and found excess annual returns of 23% for the period
1994 to 2003.
Mixed offers: In many cases the acquisition takes the form of a mix
between cash and stock consideration. The terms often involve several caveats;
financial derivatives and stock options. These kinds of mixed transactions are
much harder to analyse due to the increased complexity of the deal terms; it is
certainly harder to use these in empirical studies since each transaction must
be handled independently. Therefore this paper will leave such complicated
transactions alone and focus exclusively on pure cash and pure stock offers.
Many successful M&A cases are initially unsuccessful following the first
bid, but end up closing after all. These transactions are called revision bids.
The revision bids can come from the same company that initially bid on the
target company or they can come from rivalling acquirers. There have been
several incidences of bidding wars throughout the years and this will of course
benefit target shareholders and arbitrageurs. The famous leveraged buyout
of RJR Nabisco by the private equity firm KKR that took place in 1988 is a
good example of how target shareholders gain from a bidding war. The CEO
of RJR Nabisco wanted to buy out the shareholders at $75 per share when the
stock price was at about $50, but after a fierce bidding war the final offer went
to KKR at $109 per share valuing the company to $25 billion and making it
the largest buyout in history.3
The choice of payment method is an area of substantial academic re-
3For a great account of the events transpired in the hostile takeover of RJR Nabisco,
Bryan Burrough and John Heylar’s Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of RJR Nabsico is a
fantastic read
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search. Several hypotheses exist as to what drives the choice of payment
method for a bidding firm. Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) provide a
complete overview of the different hypotheses regarding the choice of payment
method. And the main theories on the subject is that; (i) The beneficiary
capital gains tax rules in the U.S. might motivate bidders to use stock pay-
ment. (ii) The payment method is motivated by asymmetric information, such
as investors reacting negatively to stock deals because of the fear of adverse
selection. (iii) The payment method is part of a broader capital structure
choice for the bidder. (iv) Behavioural finance suggest that the choice of stock
payment might be motivated by informational asymmetry and the wish of a
bidder to cash in on overvalued stock. But this notion of opportunistic bidder
activity is controversial and in a recent empirical study Eckbo et al. (2013)
strongly refute such a view.
1.2 Merger arbitrage risk
Merger arbitrage, or the alternative and slightly paradoxical name risk arbi-
trage, is not arbitrage in the pure sense of the word. Classic arbitrage is when
identical assets have different prices, such that an investor can instantly buy
the asset for a low price in one market then sell the same asset in another mar-
ket for a higher price. This form of pure arbitrage is in most financial markets
instantly arbitraged away as a result of efficient supply and demand. There
are certainly risks involved with merger arbitrage and not only for the dishon-
est arbitrageurs as Mr. Boesky. Arbitrageurs face an asymmetrical payoff in
their profession. If a deal goes through they profit from the relatively small
arbitrage spread, but if the deal collapses the potential loss can be huge.
Figure 4: Merger Arbitrage Disasters, losses for arbitrageurs in $million Officer (2007)
Officer (2007) shows how big the risks faced by arbitrageurs is in an
analysis of the biggest merger arbitrage disasters between 1985 to 2004, disas-
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ters being big deals that did not successfully complete. The study takes into
account the arbitrageurs holdings of the failed deals and estimates arbitrage
loss, 15 of the biggest failures all incur a loss exceeding $100 million for the ar-
bitrageurs. The most spectacular disasters, such as the failed merger between
General Electric and Honeywell in 2001, range in the multi-billion dollar loss
category. The average holdings by merger arbitrageurs in these disasters were
35% of the total target equity, implying that arbitrageurs have substantial
exposure to the losses involved with merger disasters.
The most important risk involved with merger arbitrage is the risk of
deal failure. This deal failure occurs when the merger fails to be consummated.
The reason why this is a big risk and why arbitrageurs face big losses related to
deal failure (Officer (2007)) is that if a deal is unsuccessful the target stock will
most likely fall to pre-announcement prices or even further. The arbitrageurs
will in that case incur a big loss on their investment and in addition they
usually have transactions costs and short selling costs (in stock offers) that
will go uncovered. However, the risk of deal failure is why there exists an
arbitrage spread. If there had not been any uncertainty related to mergers
and acquisitions there wouldn’t be any risk premium to harvest from these
deals.
There are many risk factors that can cause an M&A deal to fail:
Shareholder problems: Any merger or acquisition is dependent on the
shareholders of the target company to approve the offer by the acquirer. When
an offer announcement is made, it is up to the majority of the shareholders
to approve the offer in a vote. If they approve of selling their shares to the
bidder, they “tender” their shares successfully. If the offer bid is too low in
the minds of the shareholders; the merger will be unsuccessful. Clearly these
deal offers are not made on a whim, and there is often years of preparation
and due diligence work done before an offer is made. But it is still a factor
any arbitrageur must take into account when investing in a deal.
Regulatory problems: In many instances, a merger will need approval
from certain government agencies in order to be completed. This is often
agencies that are tasked with monitoring and regulating market competition in
a country. The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S. Department of Justice
Antitrust Division are the main regulatory agencies in charge of ensuring fair
competition and consumer protection in the U.S. If one of these agencies sees
a merger between two companies as “anticompetitive” and fear that the result
of the merger will be monopolistic power, unfair competitive advantages and
increased consumer prices they might step in and stop the merger. In fact,
all mergers between listed public companies in the U.S. require the explicit
consent from the Federal Trade Commission to be valid.
Funding problems: Funding risk is the risk that the necessary funding
required to complete a transaction will not be available. Due to changing fac-
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tors such as market and deal conditions; the acquirer might lose the financing
required to complete a deal. Overall market conditions might change, mak-
ing what once seemed a profitable investment unprofitable. Such things as
changing interest rates can sometimes reduce the net present value of merger
projects.
Internal target resistance: Not all mergers are “happy marriages” be-
tween consenting parties. If the merger is in fact a hostile takeover the acquirer
might face stale resistance from within the target company. There are several
defenses against hostile takeovers, such as “poison pills” that can stand in the
way of a merger. Jindra and Walkling (2002) found that the attitude of the
target management is an important determinant for takeover success.
Material Adverse Change (MAC): There is a contingency found in most
M&A contracts stipulating the terms in which the acquirer may legally ter-
minate the deal in the event of certain occurrences in the deal process. The
clauses usually regard the surfacing of aspects of the target company during
the due diligence that drastically changes the valuation of the company. The
rationale for these kinds of contracts is the protection of the acquiring firm
from shady business practices. In general, judicial expertise is a necessity for
arbitrageurs to understand the highly sophisticated deal terms of tender offers.
1.2.1 Case study: The failed merger between GE and Honeywell
What could have been the largest merger in history was announced on Oc-
tober 23. 2001. Two giants of American industry were however stopped by
European bureaucrats headed by the future prime minister of Italy. Both GE
and Honeywell were giant conglomerates with diversified divisions spanning
everything from consumer products to aerospace systems. It was a deal val-
ued at $42 billion when GE announced their bid for Honeywell, an exchange
of 1.055 of GE shares would be given for each Honeywell share. This was
equivalent of a share price at $55 per share for the Honeywell shareholders.
At a time when Honeywell stock was trading at $35 per share it seemed to be
a great offer, a premium of 44%.
Honeywell seemed very pleased with the deal; this was not a hostile
takeover. The legendary CEO of GE, Jack Welch, had even decided to post-
pone his retirement for 14 months to make sure that this important deal went
through. After six months of review at the U.S. Department of Justice the
deal was given a heads up with Honeywell share price once again going up
after a lot of doubt towards the deal. The joy was unfortunately short lived,
because on July 3. 2001 the European Council headed by Mario Monti vetoed
the deal. The EU council decided that a merger between the two would have
been damaging to competition and therefore decided to reject the merger.
The reason for this deal failure was then a regulatory obstacle, and it
killed what could have been the largest merger in the history of industry. The
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Figure 5: Honeywell Stock Price & Trading Volume
Honeywell stock price “jumps” in October 2000, but during the course of the takeover the
stock price follows the news surrounding the deal until it fails after EU votes no in July
2001
arbitrageurs who bought Honeywell stock after announcement at $53 per share
and sold after deal failure at $35 per share could possibly loose 34% of their
investment. A huge loss for any investor. This is not an unrealistic scenario,
the trading volumes were in the tens of millions shares traded on the most
busy days during the deal.
1.3 The market for Mergers and Acquisitions
To better understand merger arbitrage it is necessary to understand how the
overall market conditions affect portfolio returns. There is academic work
that shows a connection between merger activity and merger arbitrage return.
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) finds a clear connection between arbitrage capi-
tal and merger arbitrage return, and if there are more mergers there will be
more merger arbitrage capital available. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) finds
that there is a big difference between merger arbitrage returns with respect to
economic cycles. Merger arbitrage return is correlated with market returns in
depreciating markets, but in flat and appreciating markets there is no corre-
lation. Further, Edmans et al. (2012) confirms the link between the financial
markets and takeover activity by documenting that the direction of mutual
fund cash flows are correlated with the takeover market. I.e. they show that
during stressed markets when mutual funds have large net outflows of capital
there is a decreased amount of takeover attempts in the market for M&A.
There have been large variations in M&A activity over the years, an
effect that has lead researchers to coin the expression “Merger Waves”. Figure
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6 show the number of M&A transactions in the U.S market from 1897 until
2000, and it is evident that activity varies across the years. Six periods of these
high activity merger waves have taken place in the history of the United States.
Every wave has been defined by its period own set of economic, regulatory and
technological conditions.
Figure 6: U.S. Merger Wave History 1897 - 2000 Martynova and Renneboog (2008)
Gaughan (2010) describe the main features of the first five “waves”. The
first wave of 1897 to 1904 was a concentration of industrial companies with
horizontal integration being the defining feature. However; U.S. regulatory
antitrust laws were put in place to limit the monopolization of industries and
the wave ended. The second wave of 1916 to 1929 came as a result of high
economic activity during a period which also has been known as “the roaring
twenties”. The second wave of mergers was distinctly more focused on vertical
integration, and saw the creation of conglomerates and cartels where all the
value creation was collected under the same company. This period of merger
activity fell victim to the great depression that halted economies across the
world after the stock market crash of 1929. The third wave of 1965 to 1969
took the market for M&A to new heights with hitherto unseen scale and
transaction sizes. Diversification was a key argument for doing a merger in
this period, there was a lot of businesses that expanded into other industries
with their merger activity. The forth wave of 1984 to 1989 was fuelled by
the financial innovations of the time. It was the era of leveraged buyouts and
hostile takeovers. The forth wave of mergers was special because of the size
and prominence of its targets. A big increase in +$100 million mergers made
the M&A markets a very important one for the financial world. It was also a
time defined by deregulation and eased interference by regulators. As in earlier
merger waves the era ended with the economy going into a recession during
the early 1990s. The fifth wave of 1992 to 2000 was inspired by globalization,
technological development (the personal computer, telecommunication and the
internet) and banking deregulation. Mega-mergers like the AOL Time Warner
multi-billion dollar deal were plentiful. It was a grand decade for the U.S. in
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general with the fall of the USSR and their rise to prominence as the only true
global superpower. But in 2000 to 2001 there was a collapse in the technology
industry that led to the inevitable end of this wave.
The sixth wave of 2003 to 2007 is the final wave of its kind in the
history of the capital markets of the United States of America. Alexandridis
et al. (2011) point to the main drivers of this wave being the “availability of
abundant liquidity”. The source of this liquidity being historically low interest
rates and strong acquirer cash balances. Deregulation led to sophisticated
financing from derivatives and corporate bond markets, in turn you got large
cash flows and “abundant liquidity”. The era ended in the worst economic
recession since The Great Depression of the 1930s and the effects are still
being felt across the world.
The common feature of all these merger waves are that they have coin-
cided with “boom-periods” for the economy as a whole, and that they almost
invariably end as the markets fall into a recession. Harford (2004) documents
that economic, regulatory and technological shocks drives the merger waves.
But that in order for the appreciating economy to drive a merger wave it is
necessary with sufficient capital liquidity. The relevance of merger waves to
our subject of merger arbitrage is that merger activity leads to more arbitrage
capital, and arbitrage capital has been shown to affect merger arbitrage re-
turns (Baker and Savasoglu (2002)). It is therefore important to know which
periods had higher activity when reviewing the empirical studies about merger
arbitrage.
1.4 Efficient market hypothesis (EMH)
In the context of this paper it is of paramount importance to understand the
principles of efficient markets and how they can be violated. Arbitrage is
by nature the anti-thesis of efficiency and one cannot know the one without
the other. The theory of efficient markets is one of the most established and
respected theories in academic circles, especially within economics and finance,
across the world. It became an essential building block for the emerging field
of finance when it was introduced during the early 1970s, and it has been the
object of huge amount of work and analysis during the following 50 years. In
its most extreme form the efficient market hypothesis can be defined as
“A market in which prices always fully reflect all available information
is called efficient” - Fama (1970)
In sufficiently competitive markets, an investor cannot expect to achieve
superior profits from their investment strategies. The concept of merger arbi-
trage in which this paper is concerned is exactly that; an investment strategy
to achieve superior profits over the market. If the efficient market hypothesis
holds true in its stronger forms, true arbitrage without taking on extra risks
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cannot exist. If there exists a strong form efficiency in the capital markets,
returns from stocks would be impossible to predict. This form of efficiency is
connected with the notion of stock prices displaying a “random walk”, mak-
ing any sort of forecasting a fools errand. Fama (1965) argues in an empirical
review that the evidence shows great support for a model of random walk.
However; during the course of the last half centurys work on this topic no
conclusive empirical findings have neither confirmed nor dismissed the notion
of random walk completely. In a review of the efficient market hypothesis
Dimson and Mussavian (2000) sees a market that generally moves in a random
walk but with certain exceptions, noting that the
“The efficient market hypothesis is simple in principle, but remains elu-
sive”
In the case that there exist exceptions from the model of random walk,
any investor would be extremely interested in exploiting these. Some examples
of commonly known exceptions to the efficient market hypothesis and random
walk are:
Momentum: The performance of a stock in the past is a precursor to
its performance in the future. That is; if a stock has given positive returns
in the past, it is more likely than other stocks to give positive returns in
the future and vice versa. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) found that buying
well-performing stocks and selling bad-performing generated significant excess
returns over both 3-month and 12-month periods.
Reversal: A theory based in behavioural finance where stock prices seem
to overreact to relevant news, so that the overreaction will reverse itself over
time. The empirical study by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) is the magnum opus
on this strategy, but there is a large body of more recent studies that further
confirm the same findings.
Post-earnings announcement drift: Bernard and Thomas (1990) showed
that investors tend to under-react to earnings announcements. When a com-
pany announces unexpected earnings (positive or negative) the share price
does not immediately capture the news. Instead there is a period of “drifting”
towards a more final equilibrium price. This is a phenomenon in the same
sphere as reversal, but it’s a matter of under-reaction instead of over-reaction.
Fama-French factors: Fama and French (1993) found that certain stocks
continually outperformed the market; these were often smaller stocks and
stocks with high book-to-market ratios. These violations are especially im-
portant for this paper because they have been formalized by Fama and French
into a model of capital assets, rivaling the CAPM. In this paper we measure
our merger arbitrage portfolios against both CAPM and Fama-French models.
It is doubtful whether merger arbitrage can be classified as a proven
exception of EMH like these because merger arbitrage is far from riskless, as
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evidenced by the previously referenced list of risk factors. Therefore it will
never fall into the definition of pure arbitrage, but for a long time it seems as
though arbitrageurs were able to harvest fairly large excess returns. To state
with certainty that merger arbitrage is an exception from the EMH would
be perilous and reckless, even though one might find large excess returns.
Nevertheless, the evidence on excess returns is important to gain a better
understanding of this phenomenon.
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Part III
Merger arbitrage profitability
There exists a large amount of academic work on the excess return generated
by merger arbitrage. Earlier academic studies provide good insights into the
nature of merger arbitrage and methodical choices done by the leading experts
in the field. Published articles in the field of merger arbitrage have provided
the main inspiration for this paper. This part is an overview of the main
academic findings on merger arbitrage.
2 Studies on Merger Arbitrage
Empirical studies have shown for many years that stock prices of target com-
panies rise substantially after the announcement of a takeover bid. Dodd and
Ruback (1977) found excess returns to target shareholders of about 1% for
each transaction. Similarly, when Jensen and Ruback (1983) summarized the
literature on corporate takeovers they found that both target and acquirer
shareholders gained from a takeover. Surely there has been knowledge of the
premium rewarded to target shareholders during takeovers in academia for
a long time. However, this paper has focused on the studies where merger
arbitrage is seen as an investment strategy used by arbitrageurs. And since
merger arbitrage was a field unknown to most except the secretive practition-
ers of arbitrage trading until the late 1970s (Wyser-Pratte (2009)) the studies
most relevant to our paper is from the 1980s and onward.
This section provides a comprehensive look at the studies that are nec-
essary to understand in order to follow the methodology of this paper. It
is a presentation the two studies by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Baker
and Savasoglu (2002) on excess return from merger arbitrage, studies where a
deeper understanding is important as context and background for this paper.
Thereby, the section ends with a summary of selected studies on the subject of
excess return, in fact most of the academic work available. Such a summary
is useful to gauge the general level of excess return that previous academic
research has found.
2.1 Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage –
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) is a very comprehensive study of the returns gen-
erated from merger arbitrage. In a departure from the earlier studies focus
on average transaction return, the study takes the point of view of an ar-
bitrageur that continuously invests in all takeovers that is announced. The
study calculates the monthly returns from following this “passive” portfolio
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strategy, continuously updating and rebalancing the portfolio as mergers are
taking place. By using a very large data sample of 4570 U.S. mergers from the
period 1963 to 1998 merger arbitrage returns is analysed over several merger
waves and economic cycles. It is the largest data sample of all the academic
body of work on merger arbitrage and therefore it carries a lot of weight. The
researchers construct two portfolios to find the excess return over the sample
period; one normal value weighted portfolio and one portfolio that also ac-
counts for transaction costs. The hypothesis is that a lot of the reported excess
return from merger arbitrage is in practice difficult to realize due to practical
limitations such as transaction costs. And after benchmarking against CAPM
and Fama-French factor models the result is that:
“Transaction costs have a substantial effect on risk arbitrage returns”
The normal merger arbitrage portfolio generated annualized excess re-
turns against CAPM of 7.4% over the sample period, while the portfolio ac-
counting for transaction costs was reduced to annual excess returns of only
2.9%.
Another main finding is how merger arbitrage returns correlate with
the overall market conditions. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) looks at the beta
during the different states of the market conditions and they find that even
though there is no correlation during flat and appreciating markets, there is
a substantial correlation during falling markets. This is a notion mirrored by
Bhagat et al. (1987) who found that the market beta for stocks changes during
the different states of a takeover. Previous studies have thought merger arbi-
trage returns to be uncorrelated with the market, but Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001) discover that to be wrong. In fact, the market beta of the merger arbi-
trage portfolio increases from practically zero to 0.5 in months when markets
fall more than 4%. Consequently; even though merger arbitrage on average
generate good returns there is a risk of large losses during falling markets.
These results are robust and significant over a large period spanning several
economic cycles. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) uses the discovery of changing
market betas to support the claim that CAPM and linear pricing models is
lacking when evaluating the risk-reward characteristics associated with merger
arbitrage. A claim also as put forth by Bhagat et al. (1987). And that option-
pricing theory is a better tool to compute the abnormal returns associated
with merger arbitrage.
2.2 Limited Arbitrage in mergers and acquisitions – Baker and
Savasoglu (2002)
The paper by Baker & Savasoglu from 2002 traces the abnormal profits gener-
ated to a model of limited merger arbitrage. In a process very similar to that
of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) the study construct merger arbitrage portfolios
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that include all the pure cash and pure stock transactions that took place in
the U.S. between 1981 and 1996. It does however extend the portfolio con-
struction by having two sets of weighting techniques. The two techniques for
weighing stocks are; equal weighted where each stock in the portfolio have
the same weight, and value weighted where the weight of each stock in the
portfolio is determined by its market capitalization.
Baker and Savasoglu (2002) finds even higher abnormal returns for their
sample; with monthly excess returns reported between 0.6% and 0.8% each
month depending on the weighting and what benchmark model is used. That
is in the range of 7% - 10% excess return each year, on average. Of the two
weighting methods it is found that equal weighted portfolios perform better
with a higher Sharpe ratio (risk-reward ratio). The results when it comes to
transaction costs is however contrary to that of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001).
Baker & Savasoglu find that when using the same methodology to account for
transaction cost the reduction in excess return is marginal and below 0.1%
monthly. The authors offer no further explanation or discussion on this topic
other than the fact that the studies use different time periods.
What sets this particular paper apart is the extensive research done in
explaining why returns are not arbitraged away, as opposed to many other
papers that simply identifies the excess return. In a regression analysis they
find a correlation between deal completion risk, target size, the amount of
arbitrage capital available and merger arbitrage returns.
“We find evidence that supports a model where undiversified investors
sell to avoid completion risk. Arbitrageurs, limited in capital and number,
require a premium for bearing this risk.”
The supply and demand of arbitrage capital is then a strong determi-
nant of merger arbitrage returns; with less arbitrage capital available to the
market they find significantly higher merger arbitrage returns and vice versa.
Arbitrageurs is rewarded with risk premiums because of the liquidity they
provide in the form of merger arbitrage capital.
2.3 A note on cross-sectional and time-series analysis
One aspect of these studies is very important to recognize; the use of time-
series analysis. Earlier cross-sectional studies measure the return from single
merger events, event-time, and average this across deals. Cross-sectional anal-
ysis is used to explore deal-specific variables such as deal size, deal type and
so on to explain variation in the arbitrage spread. This provides very good
returns for a merger arbitrage strategy; however, it is unrealistic to assume
that one can earn these returns continuously. The studies use the average
number of transaction days and average number of transactions throughout a
year to annualize their event-time returns. Using such a method gives high
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excess returns ranging from 25% to 100% annually, but it might be unrealistic.
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) states:
“The problem with this approach is that it assumes that the risk ar-
bitrage portfolio can earn event-time returns continuously. Particularly for
transactions that are consummated quickly, this assumption can lead to large
annualized returns”
The alternate time-series method of calculating merger arbitrage returns
is used by both Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) and Baker and Savasoglu (2002),
it involves the construction of merger arbitrage portfolios and analyzing re-
turns across time, Calendar time. It allows a more thorough investigation into
abnormal returns and risk factors, and it provides a far more realistic estimate
of the excess returns achievable from merger arbitrage.
2.4 Summary of empirical evidence on merger arbitrage excess
return
Table 1 gives a summary of all the studies this paper have found on abnormal
returns from merger arbitrage. All these studies find that merger arbitrage
gives abnormal returns for its investors. It is reasonable to claim that merger
arbitrage have provided investors with strong returns. Some of the studies
investigate a very beneficial time-period that might explain the change of
abnormal returns across studies. Larcker and Lys (1987) and Branch and
Wang (2008) both use periods of merger waves, and that can be a bias. This
paper has put a lot of weight on Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) partly because of
the large sample period. Even in that study the excess returns are substantial.
In the research conducted for this paper there has not been a single instance of
an academic and peer-reviewed source that finds anything other than positive
excess returns from merger arbitrage. The evidence on excess return from
merger arbitrage is then supported by a fairly strong set of academic work.
For a further summary of the academic evidence on excess return in particular
and corporate takeovers in general Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2008) is a
great source for empirical studies.
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3 The sources of excess return
As the academic evidence shows, there is a quite clear consensus as to the ex-
cess return harvested by merger arbitrageurs. In varying degrees of magnitude,
all the academic studies point to the generation of abnormal returns. However,
although the descriptive side of simply confirming excess return is interesting
on it’s own merit, discovering the reasons why the abnormal returns are not
arbitraged away is of even larger importance. Excess return from merger ar-
bitrage is generally believed to come from two separate sources; transaction
costs and from the role arbitrageurs take in relieving shareholders of unwanted
risks.
3.1 Transaction costs
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) argues that transaction costs severely limits the
profit from merger arbitrage. Transaction costs is a general term to describe
the monetary fees involved in the process of performing merger arbitrage; such
as brokerage fees, holding costs, short selling costs and constraints, and the
cost of the capital required to take positions. The other part of transaction
costs is the limitations faced by arbitrageurs when taking positions in illiquid
stocks and the market impact of large trades.
These “nuts-and-bolts” practical limitations make up a large part of the
excess return generated by merger arbitrage according to Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001). When they construct their portfolios, as previously stated, they find
large differences in excess return when accounting for transaction costs. Over
their sample period they find transaction costs to reduce abnormal returns by
3.54% annually. Earlier studies on arbitrage also put a substantial weight on
the effect of transaction costs, such as the model developed by Garman and
Ohlson (1981) where the notion of “perfect, free and frictionless trading” is
abolished. However, the effect and magnitude of transaction costs is a debated
topic. Baker and Savasoglu (2002) does not find nearly the same effect of
transaction costs, even after applying the same methodology as Mitchell and
Pulvino (2001). Most studies seem to suggest that a much more important
source of excess return stems from the part played by arbitrageurs in taking
on unwanted idiosyncratic risks.
3.2 The role of the arbitrageur
Even after considering the transactions costs involved (Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001)) merger arbitrageurs are able to beat the market and the risk ad-
justed benchmark models with substantial margins. These superior results
from merger arbitrage as an investment strategy is either a violation of the
efficient market hypothesis, that was reviewed earlier, or there is some other
aspect of this trade giving arbitrageurs abnormal profits.
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Baker and Savasoglu (2002) found an aspect of merger arbitrage returns
related to the supply and demand of arbitrage capital to be important for
excess returns. It is then very appropriate to investigate the role of the arbi-
trageur a bit further, because the practical role of the merger arbitrageurs in
takeover processes might explain the excess return.
Larcker and Lys (1987) studied the incentives provided to merger arbi-
trageurs during the takeover process. They build upon the work of Grossman
and Stiglitz (1980) where the assumption that security prices are sufficiently
noisy for traders to engage in costly information acquisition is explored. The
study is in part an analysis of the probability for merger success when ar-
bitrageurs are involved and an analysis of the profitability of arbitrageur in-
vestments. The result from this research is a confirmation on both accounts.
The arbitrageur investment had an actual success rate of about 97 %, while
the average probability of success for a takeover was about 81 %. This leads
Larcker and Lys (1987) to state that “arbitrageurs are able to acquire supe-
rior information regarding the ultimate success or failure of an acquisition
proposal”. They also find that merger arbitrageurs achieve excess returns on
their investment equity positions during takeovers. Combined; these results
imply that prices are sufficiently noisy to create incentives for the arbitrageurs
to gather costly information about takeovers (Industry reports, networking
and analysis). The much cited paper of Larcker & Lys shows that merger
arbitrageurs are able to, and incentivized to, gather private information that
gives them an advantage during takeover events. It does suggest, however,
a quite passive role for merger arbitrageurs; a role where a circle of industry
professionals have superior knowledge about transactions and gain a profit
from this informational advantage.
Cornelli and Li (2001) argue that there might bet a different explanation
as to why merger arbitrageurs are so successful. Merger arbitrageurs might
not have a clear informational advantage about transactions before the fact,
but that they rather increase the probability of takeover success by getting
involved. They postulate the theory that “the presence of arbitrageurs affects
the value of the target shares, since arbitrageurs are more likely to tender”.
When an arbitrageur takes a position in a target company it is with a clear
intent to sell, tender, his shares at consummation of the deal. The arbitrageur
might try to hold on to the stock in an effort to raise the bid and generate a
larger profit, but in the end there is a definite intent to sell. The market knows
this and the arbitrageur knows that the market knows this. The information
advantage for the arbitrageur is the knowledge that he has bought shares,
an advantage of private information. Cornelli and Li (2001) shows, with a
series of theoretical proofs, that the arbitrageur is able to generate profits as
long as his presence in the market is not completely revealed. If large scale
arbitrage activity is revealed, thereby increasing probability of deal success,
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the market will react and buy stock in the target company. This will in turn
raise the price and reduce the arbitrage spread. The paper shows that there
is a positive relationship between trading volume and a probability of success
for a takeover. Also, if the stock is more liquid it is easier for arbitrageurs to
hide their trading; this increases returns for the arbitrageurs if they decide to
invest.
For the sake of the main issue in this part, the role of the arbitrageur,
the most central proposition of this paper is that merger arbitrageurs help to
facilitate successful takeovers. That the arbitrageurs are far from free-riders
looking for an easy profit, instead they often take the role of large shareholders
that champion takeovers through and in turn increase the company value.
In an effort to merge the opposing view on arbitrageurs as either passive
(Larcker & Lys) or active (Cornelli & Li) players in the market for takeovers,
Hsieh and Walkling (2004) did an empirical study that supports both argu-
ments. By using a sample of 608 offers over the 1992 to 1999 period they found
that arbitrage holdings are more prevalent in successful deals than unsuccess-
ful ones. This is the same result as Larcker and Lys (1987) and supports the
view of passive arbitrageurs. However, they also found that the actual change
in arbitrage holdings were correlated with bid premium, bid success and arbi-
trage returns. This is mirroring the predictions made in the model by Cornelli
and Li (2001). In other words, Hsieh and Walkling (2004) found that arbi-
trageurs seems to pick the deals that eventually turns out to be successful thus
implying a superior knowledge and insight into the market for M&A consistent
with the passive role. And they also found that arbitrageurs seem to affect im-
portant deal outcomes like bid revisions, bid premium and arbitrage returns.
This is more consistent with the active role where the arbitrageur influencing
the terms and the outcomes of the offer with his presence. Then the opposing
views on the role of arbitrageurs is not necessarily mutually exclusive, rather
it is a possibility that arbitrageurs play different roles at different times. The
conclusion of the paper is however quite difficult to ignore:
“Overall, we find that merger arbitrageurs play an important role in the
market for corporate control.”
Further supporting the argument that arbitrageurs take on the risks not
wanted by other investors, Pontiff (2006) conclude that the “single largest
impediment to market efficiency” is the idiosyncratic risk that arbitrageurs
take off the shoulders of average investors.
In the context of this paper these results are important in understanding
the excess returns generated from merger arbitrage. Arbitrageurs provide large
amounts of liquidity, they can provide an exit strategy for risk-averse share-
holders, they are specialists in their own field, and they can actually influence
the outcome and terms of takeover transactions. This makes it doubtful as to
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whether the excess return generated from merger arbitrage in reality can be
seen as a violation of the efficient market hypothesis. Rather it seems as a fair
premium rewarded to the arbitrageurs for their part in transactions.
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4 The declining trend in arbitrage spreads
Even though it is safe to say that merger arbitrage has empirically generated
excess return in the past, there is another topic in this sphere of academia
that seems hard to refute. The fact that the excess returns generated by
hedge funds, who uses merger arbitrage extensively in their portfolio strategies,
seems to be declining over time. The topic of hedge fund research is a slight
departure from the core of this paper, but it still has enough relevance to grant
a bit of further investigation.
Many hedge funds use merger arbitrage as a strategy for creating risk
neutral portfolios and there is a fairly large group of hedge funds that specialize
exclusively in this form of trading as well. Ackermann et al. (1999) compares
the performance of several known hedge fund strategies and find that “Event-
driven risk arbitrage” generates substantial returns and display very beneficial
risk characteristics. The paper concludes by establishing merger arbitrage as
a superior strategy for most hedge funds. In a similar investigation of hedge
fund strategies, Agarwal and Naik (2000) show that event-driven arbitrage
funds harvest monthly alpha of about 1 percent. These and other studies then
confirm the dependency of hedge fund returns, from merger arbitrage, and
general merger arbitrage returns.
The interesting aspect of hedge fund returns from merger arbitrage, in
the context of this paper, is that they seem to be declining. Fung et al.
(2007) notes in a study of hedge fund performance that returns have declined
over the period of 1998 to 2004. The sample results show this to be true
for hedge funds in general but also find a specific decline in alphas for event-
driven merger arbitrage funds. The explanation for this, the authors argue, is
that increased capital into the hedge fund industry adversely affects the funds
ability to generate excess return. Zhong (2008) has also found declining alphas
for hedge funds specializing in merger arbitrage.
In a comprehensive and fairly recent study, Jetley and Ji (2010) inves-
tigates this phenomenon of merger arbitrage spreads over the course of the
period 1990 to 2007. They document a ”substantial decline in the arbitrage
spread since the 1990s”. The study show, with statistical significance, that
the first-day arbitrage spread on average is 4.8% lower for transactions in the
period from 2002 to 2007 than for transactions in the preceding decade of the
1990s.
The large decline in arbitrage spreads for successful transactions over dif-
ferent periods is striking, see figure 7. The explanation for this phenomenon is
probably multi-faceted. Increasing interest in the strategy of merger arbitrage
may force spreads down due to efficiency. Increasing number of hedge funds
and hedge fund capital may as well have similar effects. Jetley and Ji (2010)
also adds the changing characteristics of deals as a contributing factor, such
as higher number of cash deals and fewer hostile bids.
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Figure 7: The Declining Arbitrage Spread from the 1990s to the 2000s, Jetley and Ji
(2010)
In summary of this part, according to academic literature, excess return
is generated from merger arbitrage. This excess return originates from several
sources; it is a premium for the risks involved with deal failure, it has to do with
the limited supply of arbitrage capital, it includes an element of transaction
costs, and finally the role of the arbitrageurs is also a factor. This knowledge is
based on studies done on mergers and acquisitions done in the 1980s and 1990s.
More recent studies focused on hedge fund performance show that margins are
falling, this tendency could perhaps apply to general merger arbitrage as well.
This paper then set forth to see if anything has changed during the last ten
years, and it will analyse merger arbitrage from 2000 to 2012. The structure
in the process of analysing merger arbitrage in the U.S. over this period is
as follows: Part IV covers the gathering and structuring of data, and the
construction of merger arbitrage portfolios for time-series analysis. Part V
is the analysis and benchmarking of the merger arbitrage portfolio returns.
Part VI provides the final conclusion, and practical implications of merger
arbitrage.
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Part IV
Data and Method
This paper uses data provided by Thomson Reuters Security Data Corpora-
tion (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database.4 The data cover all M&A
transactions in the U.S. during the period between 2000 and 2012. The atten-
tion is restricted to transactions between U.S. public companies. As the U.S.
stock market is considered among the most efficient5, and provides sufficient
data for the analysis. A public company is in this paper defined as a publicly
held company of which securities are listed on the stock exchange. This sec-
tion will in the following parts cover the data description, data selection and
the data sample.
5 Data Description
In practice, arbitrageurs typically invest in a broad range of M&A transactions
including different methods of consideration offers. However, not all of these
transactions are handy to analyse because of the enormity of the data. This
paper will use a data sample consisting of pure cash and pure stock deals.
Mixed offers and offers including other financial instruments are not included
in the data sample.6
Cash deals include all deals where the acquirer bids for a fixed amount
of dollar in payment. Note that these deals do not necessarily mean that
the payment must be in cash. As long as the consideration is in fixed dollar
terms the deal is classified as cash deal. Stock deals include all deals where
both parties of an M&A deal consider stock-swaps to a predetermined ratio
for stock exchange. Including both types of deals provides a sound basis for
the data analysis, and it captures some of the features of possible investment
strategies that are used by the arbitrageurs.
5.1 Data selection
In total, SDC provides 3 671 cash and stock deal transactions for this pe-
riod. The SDC database provides a customized report with summaries of
all deals, specifying announcement date, and effective or withdrawal date to
each deal. It also contains information on exchange ratio, firm identifications,
and market capital to both target and acquirer firm. The information of the
companies from SDC is matched up with The Center for Research in Security
4SDC is the foremost financial database which practitioners and researchers often use and
rely on.
5Low transaction costs and low costs related to obtaining information and trading con-
tribute to liquidity and efficiency in the U.S. stock market.
6The complexity in those deals makes it difficult to generalize into certain categories,
which is problematic for the evaluation of such large data samples.
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Prices (CRSP) database to retrieve stock price data.7 The match up of both
databases lead to exclusion of 1 666 transactions. The elimination of deals is
caused by insufficient information; company identifications do not match with
the CRSP database, missing stock price information of either the acquirer or
the target or both, missing completion date, or missing exchange ratios.8 The
remaining 2 005 transactions make up the sample used in the main analysis
of this paper.
5.2 Sample
Table 2: Data population and sample statistics
Complete SDC data (Population) Sample Sample /
population %Year All Cash Stock Cash % Stock % All Cash Stock Cash % Stock %
2000 584 318 266 54 % 46 % 368 221 147 60 % 40 % 63 %
2001 418 240 178 57 % 43 % 248 151 97 61 % 39 % 59 %
2002 284 203 81 71 % 29 % 159 113 46 71 % 29 % 56 %
2003 307 227 80 74 % 26 % 170 128 42 75 % 25 % 55 %
2004 187 116 71 62 % 38 % 104 66 38 63 % 37 % 56 %
2005 267 129 138 48 % 52 % 155 120 35 77 % 23 % 58 %
2006 324 218 106 67 % 33 % 156 130 26 83 % 17 % 48 %
2007 326 193 133 59 % 41 % 152 124 28 82 % 18 % 47 %
2008 265 177 88 67 % 33 % 131 108 23 82 % 18 % 49 %
2009 249 150 99 60 % 40 % 140 108 32 77 % 23 % 56 %
2010 198 127 71 64 % 36 % 93 67 26 72 % 28 % 47 %
2011 142 85 57 60 % 40 % 68 51 17 75 % 25 % 48 %
2012 120 67 53 56 % 44 % 61 34 27 56 % 44 % 51 %
Total 3671 2250 1421 61 % 39 % 2005 1421 584 71 % 29 % 55 %
Table 2 is split into two sections. The first section depicts data received
from SDC, while the second section shows the sample data. Each section is
broken into five columns of the following categories: all deals, cash deals, stock
deals, and the proportions of each deal type. In total the sample accounts for
55% of all deals from SDC. Both data from SDC and the sample reveals clear
preferences to cash payments in M&A deals during this period. Cash trans-
actions dominate every year, except from 2005 when cash payments accounts
for 48%. The table also shows that activity in mergers and acquisitions have
decreased throughout the period, starting off with 584 mergers and acquisition
transactions in 2000, and reduced to only 120 transactions in 2012.
The final sample of mergers and acquisitions in this paper is illustrated
in Figure 8. It shows a histogram spanning all the years in the sample from
2000 to 2012. The histogram is broken into three parts; black represents
number of cash transactions, stripes represents stock transactions, and white
represents the missing transactions which do not satisfy the requirements in
the match-up between SDC and CRSP database. The trend in mergers and
acquisitions activity reveal similarities with the economic developments during
7CRSP maintains one of the largest and most comprehensive historical databases in stock
market research. The database contains historical stock price data on all common stocks on
NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ.
8Additional research into SEC-files (Securities and Exchange Commission) and in historic
announcement news was performed to add to the missing exchange ratios. But not all were
found.
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Figure 8: Mergers & Acquisitions Sample, 2000 - 2012
this period. As the discussion on merger waves showed that M&A activity
historically correlate with economic cycles, so does the M&A activity for this
sample. Good times in the economy drive up the activity in mergers and
acquisitions. Slowdowns in the economy will lead to decrease the activity.
The number of transactions peaked in both year of 2000 and 2007, followed by
a significant decrease in the following years. 2000 was the year prior the burst
in dot-com bubble in 2001. 2007 was the final year of the sixth merger wave
with a boom in the economy still ongoing in the minds of most investors, just
right before the financial crisis of 2008. The sample shows a clear overweight
of cash transactions for all the years.
Figure 9: Average Market Capitalizations for M & A Transactions
An important distinction between stock and cash transactions is that
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often stock deals is more comprehensive both in terms of size and duration.
Figure 9 illustrates that stock deals on average are substantially larger than
cash deals. The annual average market capitalization of target firms has been
up to 10 times larger than the average market capitalization of cash deals.
The comprehension of stock deals is also reflected by the average duration
of the deals, illustrated in Figure 10. During the period between 2000 and
2012, the average duration of stock deals is 106 days, while cash deals has an
average duration on 60 days. The duration of stock deals peaked in 2004 with
an average on 138 days. Cash deals on the other hand had the lowest average
duration in 2012 on 46 days.
Figure 10: Average Transaction Duration
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6 Modeling Merger Arbitrage Return
This paper measures merger arbitrage return by constructing time-series port-
folios of M&A deals. All the deals in the sample is put in portfolios that
rebalance monthly as new deals take place and old ones are completed across
the time period. The purpose of this paper is to explore if merger arbitrage
generally is a profitable passive investment strategy. A passive investment
strategy entails that all merger and acquisition events are included; there is
no selection or picking of events. This is also the reason for investigating the
US stock market, because it provides a largest possible sample of the M&A
universe in the analysis in order to derive significant conclusions. The method
of constructing the merger arbitrage portfolios is based on the assumption that
the arbitrageurs have access to unlimited capital.
The deals in the portfolios may vary in size, transaction duration, and
level of risk. The study distinguishes between cash and stock portfolios. Both
portfolios are also assigned two different weighing methods, value weighted
and equal weighted portfolios. In total, four portfolios are created, which all
will contribute to a robust analysis. Since each portfolio contains multiple
deals with different durations, and start or end dates, the returns of all deals
are assembled into monthly portfolio returns. Portfolio performances will then
only be determined by the monthly returns. Since this is a time-series anal-
ysis, the risk related to the portfolios will be measured by the variations of
monthly portfolio returns. To limit the scope of the analysis and for the sake
of simplicity, transaction costs are not accounted for. Several previous studies
find the impact of transactions costs on the abnormal returns to be negligible.9
Keeping this in mind is however important as the effect of transaction costs
may reduce the magnitude of modelled returns.
In the following sub-sections the paper presents the calculation of cash
and stock deals returns, a calculation of monthly and annualised returns, and
finally the construction of value weighted and equal weighted portfolios.
6.1 Calculating Cash and Stock Deal Returns
Returns to cash and stock portfolios are calculated differently due to the dif-
ferent characteristics related to the investment strategies. For cash deals the
returns of each position is rather easy to construct; taking a long position in
the target firm and hold the position until the terminating date. Holding this
position gives two sources for the return. The primary source comes from the
change in the stock price during the holding period. The second source comes
from the dividend payment received for holding the target stock. The total
9Baker and Savasoglu (2002) argues that the impact of transaction costs is rather small
in the period from 1981 to 1996 even after applying the methodology of Mitchell and Pulvino
(2001)
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returns for the holding period can be calculated in the following equation:
Rit =
P Tit +D
T
it − P Tit−1
P Tit−1
Rit is the daily return at the close of market day t, for holding stock i.
P Tit is the target stock price at the close of market day. In this equation T
refers to target. DTit is the dividend paid from target on day t for holding the
stock i. The subscript t− 1 refers to the closing day prior to t.
Returns for stock deals are more complicated. In stock deals the target
receives acquirer stock to a pre-specified ratio as payment. Hence, the returns
for holding the target stock equals to the appreciation of target stock and
the depreciation of acquirer stock. To measure the holding period return it
is necessary to replicate this stock-swap transaction by taking two positions
simultaneously after announcement: a long position in the target and a short
position in the acquirer. The ratio between these two positions corresponds
to the pre-specified exchange ratio given in the deal. Stock deals generate
three sources for returns. The primary source of the return comes from the
changes in stock prices of the target and the acquirer. Appreciation of target
stock price and depreciation of acquirer stock price contribute to profit for
the holding period. The secondary source for return comes from dividend
payments. Dividends paid by target give positive return, while dividends paid
by acquirer have a negative impact on the return. The third source for return
comes from risk-free return received on the proceeds from the short sale of
the acquirer stock. The return for stock deals is described in the following
formula:
Rit =
P Tit +D
T
it − P Tit−1 −∆(PAit +DAit − PAit−1 − rfPAit−1)
PositionV aluet−1
In this equationRit is the sum of both of returns from the long position in
target and short position in acquirer. PAit is the acquirer stock price at the close
of market day t for holding stock i. A refers to acquirer. DAit is the dividend
paid from acquirer on day t for holding stock i. Rf is the daily risk-free return
from the short sale proceed. ∆ is the hedge ratio, which equals to the exchange
ratio between target and acquirer. Position value is the total value of both
positions for same up-front investment in target and acquirer. It is worth
noting that an investment in both firms is required because the proceeds of
shorting the acquirer stock cannot be used to buy the target stock. Even if
the formula above is theoretically correct, the arbitrageur will in practice often
receive less than risk-free rate on short sale proceeds. In addition, the proceeds
also face additional risk, e.g. the lender recalls the short position prior to the
completion of the merger (Baker and Savasoglu (2002)), or the deal fails to
complete on the expected date. These factors lead to an approximately zero
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gain on the short sale proceeds when discounting for uncertainties and risks.
In this paper it is assumed that the arbitrageur will have zero return on short
sale proceeds. The total returns for stock deals can then be formulated in the
following equation when short sale proceeds are removed:
Rit =
P Tit +D
T
it − P Tit−1 −∆(PAit +DAit − PAit−1)
PositionV aluet−1
6.2 Calculating Monthly Portfolio Returns
To compute the monthly portfolio returns, it is necessary to calculate the
monthly returns of each deal type first. Monthly returns are based on the
daily deal return computed in the previous section. These daily returns are
compounded geometrically into monthly returns in the following manner:
RM =
T∏
t=1
(1 +Rit)− 1
The equation shows that the monthly return, RM , equals the sum-
product of all daily returns, Rit. The subscripts i and t refer to transaction of
stock i on day t. T refers to the number of trading days in a month. Trading
days are defined as all working days, i.e. from Monday to Friday. Holidays
are not included in trading days. The purpose of the portfolio is to gauge the
returns derived from positions where the bid-price is not completely reflected
in the share price, i.e. the arbitrage spread. The returns should, however, not
be affected by the takeover premium. Takeover premium can only be gained if
the arbitrageur invested prior to the announcement date. A merger arbitrage
strategy, as a passive strategy, involves only mergers and acquisitions deals
after public announcements. It should therefore not take part in the takeover
premium. However, in some cases the dataset provided by CRSP did regis-
ter substantial increase in stock returns the day following the announcement
date. The large returns are most probably a result of deals being announced
after the markets are closed and thereby giving the entire takeover premium
as the portfolio return the next day. To avoid the returns of the merger ar-
bitrage investments being inadvertently biased upward, all investments start
two days after the announcement dates.10 The positions in a given transaction
are held until the termination date, when the transaction is completed, with-
drawn or revised. Revised transactions will first be terminated as withdrawn,
then count as a new transaction according to new bid price. One target can
then generate multiple transactions. This is similar to the study of Mitchell
and Pulvino (2001).
10Both the studies by Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Baker and Savasoglu (2002) use a two-
day lag after the announcement date as the start date for the merger arbitrage investment.
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6.3 Calculating Merger Arbitrage Portfolio Returns
A merger arbitrage portfolio contains positions in multiple deals at the same
time. Monthly portfolio returns consist of the weighted total monthly returns
of all positions in active deals. Investments start two days after announcement
dates, and terminate at the end of each month. Ongoing deals from previous
month will continue new positions at the start of a new month. The portfolio
starts off by rebalancing all active positions. Deals, in which the terms are
revised before the deal consummation, are treated as multiple transactions.
Deals with multiple bidders are also handled as multiple transactions.
Two strategies related to cash- and stock portfolio are constructed; Value
weighted and equal weighted portfolios. A value weighted portfolio scales each
position by the market value of target equity compared to the total market
value of the portfolio at the end of the previous month. An equal weighted
portfolio scales all positions equally, i.e. to a ratio of one to the total number of
active deals. The formulas for the value weighted and equal weighted monthly
return equals to (Carina et al. 1998):
Value weighted: RP =
Nj∑
i=1
Vi
(
M∏
t=m
(1 +Rit)− 1
)
Nj∑
i=1
Vj
Equal weighted: RP =
Nj∑
i=1
Vi
(
M∏
t=m
(1 +Rit)− 1
)
N
Vi is the market value of target i on the announcement date. Nj is the
total number of active deals in the portfolio during month j. The calculation
of monthly portfolio returns are based on the assumption that the arbitrageurs
have unlimited access to capital, and transaction costs are absent to invest-
ment. Both assumptions are clearly not realistic. However, the time series
of returns generated from this approach provides a benchmark that is useful
in analysing if merger arbitrage strategy is a superior investment strategy.
For comparison it is more intuitive to present the portfolio returns in annual
terms. The formula for geometric annual return is:
RAnnual =
12∏
t=1
(1 +RMonthly)− 1
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Part V
Results
7 Merger Arbitrage Return
This section determines the return characteristics of the data sample ranging
from 2000 to 2012. Former academic theory suggests that merger arbitrage
generates excess returns, for previous periods this has been established on
a solid basis. This paper sets forth to analyse merger arbitrage returns in
the U.S from 2000 until 2012, and with that become an updated and new
look at merger arbitrage. The section is structured such that there is an
overview of the major portfolio returns from merger arbitrage at first, both
value weighted and equal weighted figures are included. A practical view
on the merger arbitrage investment is then illustrated by an analysis of the
cumulative returns of the merger arbitrage portfolios in opposed to the market
portfolio. To evaluate the performance of the merger arbitrage portfolios, there
is a discussion on the relationship between risk and reward related to these
portfolios.
7.1 Merger Arbitrage Portfolio Returns; 2000 - 2012
Measuring portfolio returns is a simple manner of accessing the characteristics
of a strategy. But to get a relative understanding of portfolio performances,
the portfolio returns must be compared to an appropriate benchmark. A
benchmark is a proxy for the average investor. The benchmark is appropriate
for relative comparison if it contains fundamental elements that match up with
the portfolios, i.e. give access to all securities, capital, returns, transaction
costs etc. which are offered by the portfolios (Bacon (2004)). The purpose for
this paper is to evaluate the performances of the merger arbitrage portfolios
relative to the market. To insure consistency with the portfolios and their
purposes, the value weighted CRSP index is used as benchmark.11
11The equal weighted CRSP index does not really reflect the average investors portfolio
in the market, as this index is more heavily scaled to small caps than the common market
index, which is represented by the value weighted CRSP index.
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Table 3: Merger Arbitrage Returns, 2000 to 2012
The table display the sample data return result. Returns are denoted in percent (%).
Returns are categorized in terms of weighting and the rightmost column show returns for
the CRSP index. ∆ is the percentage difference between return from the merger arbitrage
portfolio (to the left) and the CRSP index. The bottom row calculates the compound
annual growth rate (CAGR) for each portfolio over the total period.
Value Weighted Returns (%) Equal Weighted Returns (%)
Year Cash ∆ Stock ∆ Cash ∆ Stock ∆ CRSP Index (%)
2000 4,34 16,37 30,93 42,96 -7,25 4,78 0,69 12,72 -12,03
2001 7,17 19,61 -44,12 -31,68 17,01 29,46 5,43 17,88 -12,44
2002 -5,22 16,89 9,03 31,14 11,76 33,87 21,86 43,97 -22,11
2003 19,45 -11,34 5,79 -24,99 20,77 -10,01 23,34 -7,45 30,79
2004 11,19 0,34 15,38 4,53 23,42 12,57 5,08 -5,76 10,85
2005 3,64 -1,75 9,87 4,48 2,51 -2,88 4,67 -0,72 5,39
2006 11,12 -2,92 18,95 4,91 11,22 -2,82 2,00 -12,04 14,04
2007 -14,78 -20,06 50,26 44,98 2,41 -2,86 27,53 22,26 5,27
2008 -19,48 20,17 69,67 109,32 -20,64 19,01 16,91 56,56 -39,65
2009 3,33 -24,76 2,15 -25,93 56,72 28,63 -35,03 -63,12 28,09
2010 2,29 -12,95 15,55 0,32 4,47 -10,77 15,97 0,74 15,24
2011 1,69 4,79 -14,74 -11,64 1,42 4,52 -3,45 -0,35 -3,10
2012 7,10 -5,82 26,06 13,14 4,91 -8,01 26,36 13,44 12,92
CAGR 2,08 -0,11 12,51 12,43 9,34 7,35 7,77 6,01 0,59
Table 3 depicts the annual returns from all four portfolios, both value
weighted and equal weighted of cash and stock, and the returns from the value
weighted CRSP index. Given a benchmark to compare with, the portfolio
performances can be measured by the amount of return gained in excess to
the benchmark, called excess return. Positive excess return means that the
portfolio performed better than its benchmark. Negative excess return means
poor performance as opposed to its benchmark. The excess return of each
portfolios are depicted in the columns to the right of each portfolio.
The table shows that in most of the years the portfolios have higher
annual returns than the market. In total, for all the portfolios, there is negative
excess return in less than a third of the data. Even more interesting is the
portfolios performances in depressed markets.12 During this period the market
had negative annual returns in five years. In four of these five years, the
market had annual returns below -10%. Merger arbitrage portfolios, on the
other hand, only performed below -10% in two years, at most, during that
period. The bottom row of the table depicts calculations of the Compound
Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) for all the portfolios. This is the geometric
average return across all the years13, and takes into account the compounding
effect of returns across time. During this period the market has shown a
CAGR of 0.59% annually, which is quite low compared to the historical market
12Depressed market is in this paper defined as market with a negative annual return.
13See appendix for calculation
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estimates.14
The reason for the low CAGR is due to this paper covering a time-period
where the overall market has been through two severe downturns.15 2008 was
an especially difficult year for the markets with a 40% decline in equity value
for the entire market. The market collapse in 2008 was of grand proportions
for the U.S. economy. When including an event as such in a study of relatively
short time period, the event will have large impact on the derived results of
the market performance. In fact, in hindsight the average investor would have
been better off putting all the money in the bank instead of investing in the
market. On average, all merger arbitrage portfolios outperformed the market.
The value weighted portfolios of cash and stock had a CAGR of respectively
2.08% and 12.51%. The equal weighted portfolios of cash and stock had a
CAGR of respectively 9.34% and 7.77%. The table of time-series returns from
the period of 2000 to 2012 is very interesting in the context of comparing
to previous studies. This analysis is very similar to the research done by
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), except that their study covered the period from
1963 to 1998. Using the exact same methodology, the CRSP market index
had a CAGR of 6.22% over the 35 yrs in that study. Their merger arbitrage
portfolio, consisting of both stock and cash mergers, had also a higher an-
nual return of 16.05% , with only a single negative year over the whole period.
Clearly, The Times They Are a-Changin’.
14The CRSP index has over the period 1926 to 2012 given a CAGR of about 5.5%.
15The two severe market downturn are the burst of the Dotcom-bubble in 2001 and the
burst of the financial crisis in 2008.
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7.2 Cumulative portfolio returns
This part of the section displays the cumulative returns of the merger arbitrage
portfolios, showing more practical results from the viewpoint of an investor.
Figure 11 and 12 illustrates the cumulative wealth of investing $1000 and
holding that investment in twelve years, from the start date of January 1st,
2000 until December 31st, 2012. Figure 11 shows the cumulative wealth for
the value weighted portfolios, and Figure 12 illustrates the equal weighted
portfolios. Both portfolios are benchmarked to the value weighted CRSP
index, which is a proxy of the market.
Figure 11: Cumulative Return: Value Weighted
Both value weighted merger arbitrage portfolios outperformed the mar-
ket at every point during this period. The stock portfolio is the most profitable
portfolio with an accumulated wealth of $2 900 over the period. Compara-
tively the cash portfolio accumulates $1 236. Not impressive return over twelve
years, but still better than the average investor in the market who barely broke
even at $1 063 in 2012. Both equal weighted portfolios performed better than
both value weighted portfolios of cash and stock, on average.
The equal weighted cash portfolio generated $4 106 during the period,
while the equal weighted stock portfolio gained a return of $2 449.16
The merger arbitrage investments have proved to be a very profitable
strategy during the time period from 2000 to 2012. The most successful portfo-
lio, the equal weighted cash portfolio, generated a return almost four times to
16DeMiguel et al. (2007) has in fact shown that equal weighted portfolios (1/N strategy)
might be superior to other portfolio choices. In the paper the researchers test an equal
weighted portfolio extensively against mean-variance portfolios, value weighting, and a myr-
iad of other advanced techniques from modern finance. However, not one of the sophisticated
methods are able to beat the equal weighted method in any significant manner.
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Figure 12: Cumulative Return: Equal Weighted
the market. While the market have suffered through two severe downturns, the
merger arbitrage investments seems mostly sheltered from the market risk. It
is worth noting that the estimation of cumulative returns do not include trans-
action costs related to the investments. By excluding transaction costs, the
estimated returns will be higher than the actual returns. Nevertheless, trans-
action costs have declined during the last decades and are currently relatively
low. Even though the actual returns may not be as great as the estimates,
it is certain that merger arbitrage have been a lucrative investment strategy
during this period.
7.3 Merger arbitrage return and volatility characteristics
In general, financial theory is built on the thought that returns can only be
gained by bearing risks. Returns obtained in excess to the market are often
explained by the investor taking a higher risk than the average investor. The
logic behind this theory is that there is no “free lunch”. The investor will
only get an extra premium if she is willing to bear the risks that the market
despises. But, what exactly is risk? Risk is defined in many ways, and there are
as many ways of measuring it. In this section risk is defined as the variations
in the returns and measured by the standard deviation.17 If the returns have
a large variance and uncertainty of movement it is said that the returns have
high risks. The correlation between return and risk is contradictory to the
investors preferences. Investors find high returns attractive, but they despise
risk. If a portfolio has high return but also a high level of risk, this will reduce
17For calculation; see appendix
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the attractiveness to the portfolio.
In order to evaluate the quality and the performance of a portfolio, both
factors of risk and return must be taken into consideration. A popular mea-
surement often used to evaluate portfolio performances is the Sharpe Ratio
(SR).18 The SR measures the reward-to-risk relationship in the portfolio. A
positive SR means that the portfolio gained returns in excess of the risk free
rate. A high SR indicates that the portfolio gives high return for each unit
of variability. If evaluating a portfolio with only the SR in isolation, investors
would favour portfolios with the highest ratio. The SR enable the investors
to easily rank the portfolios in order of preferences. However, the SR can
sometimes be negative. In such cases this measurement does not make much
sense. An alternative measurement which can be used is the M2.19 The M2
risk-adjusts the returns of the portfolio.20 The idea behind this measurement
is to imagine that a portfolio is mixed with a risk-free position so that the
complete or adjusted portfolio matches the risk to the benchmark or the mar-
ket. Hence, by using M2 one can judge the size of portfolio performances.
This gives a better feel for the numerical value derived by this method.
Table 4: Portfolio Performance Evaluation
The table show the performance of the merger arbitrage portfolios and the CRSP index in
terms of the standard performance indicators Sharpe Ratio and M2.
Value weighted Equal weighted
Cash Stock Cash Stock CRSP Index
CAGR (%) 2,08 12,51 9,34 7,77 0,59
σ Standard Deviation (%) 11,24 21,81 10,88 18,37 16,73
Sharpe Ratio -0,02 0,47 0,65 0,30 -0,10
M2 (%) 1,41 9,54 12,56 6,69
Table 4 depicts the portfolio CAGR and annualized standard deviations
based on the monthly returns, as well as calculations of the performance eval-
uation metrics of SR and M2. The table shows that both cash portfolios have
lower standard deviations than the market, while both stock portfolios have
higher standard deviations. These findings are interesting. The difference in
the standard deviations can be explained by different mechanisms involved
with the merger arbitrage of stock and cash deals.
Cash deals only include taking one long position on the target stock.
The outcomes of a cash deal is often limited to either the bid-price, if the deal
succeed, and the pre-announcement price (in most cases), if the deal fails to go
trough. With a bid-price functioning as a cap, and a pre-announcement price
18For calculation; see appendix
19The designation M2 does not include any element being squared. M2 is simply named af-
ter proposal by the partnership between Leah Modigliani (1997) and her grandfather Franco
Modigliani (Bacon (2004)).
20For calculation; see appendix
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functioning as a floor for the outcomes of a deal, the variance and standard
deviation for a cash deal is reduced to a certain spread. The fluctuations in
returns among the deals are then limited.
The increased volatility involved with stock deals is due to the complex-
ity of the deal, which include two positions. One long position on the target
stock, and one short position on the acquirer stock. By holding two positions
in each deal, the returns for the outcomes can vary a lot more compared to
cash deals. If the deal succeed, the return will be similar to the case of cash
deals. However, if the deal does not complete or is withdrawn, the downturn
can be much worse, as the negative returns will come from both positions of
target and acquirer. The target stock will fall to its pre-announcement price,
causing negative returns. The acquirer stock will theoretically increase to its
initial price before the bid, which also will cause negative returns for the ar-
bitrageur who hold a short position on the acquirer. This is why the stock
portfolios have some of the worst performances in certain years when the mar-
ket is depressed. This is illustrated by the performances of the value weighted
stock portfolio in 2001 and the equal weighted stock portfolio in 2009 with
respectively returns of -44% and -35%.
Figure 13: Risk & Return
All portfolios outperformed the market with SR higher than the bench-
mark of -0.1. The best portfolio in terms of risk-reward is the equal weighted
cash portfolio of 0.47. The portfolio with the lowest SR is the value weighted
cash portfolio of -0.02. Negative SR means that the portfolio gained an av-
erage annual return lower than what is given by the risk-free rate. Since the
portfolio value weighted cash portfolio does contain risk, it might be confus-
ing why the portfolio does not provide a higher return. As discussed in the
previous section, the portfolio and market returns in the time-period covered
in this paper is highly affected by two years of significant market downturns.
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Both portfolio and market return is thus lower than what is usually expected
from long term performances. In this case the M2 is a better measurement.
The M2 provides only non-negative real numbers, given in units of percentage
return, and is preferred when ranking portfolios relatively. The mechanics
of the M2 measurement is to show the hypothetical return a portfolio would
have if it matched the variance of the benchmark index. The M2 measurement
enables direct comparison with the market index. In the case of the merger
arbitrage portfolio the M2 for value weighted cash and stock are respectively
1.41% and 9.54%. For the equal weighted portfolios the M2 are respectively
12.56% and 6.69%. All of the merger arbitrage portfolios outperformed the
market index at 0.59% over the period.
Summarizing this section on merger arbitrage returns, the data sample
from the period between 2000 and 2012 indicate that the merger arbitrage
portfolios outperformed the market, independent of which methodologies be-
ing used, i.e value weighted or equal weighted of cash or stock. Even when
adjusting for risks, all portfolios still show superior returns. Both Sharpe
Ratios and M2 are consistently higher than the market index. Hence, this
section can conclude that the merger arbitrage strategy will still give a higher
risk-reward ratio than the market.
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8 Benchmarking Merger Arbitrage Returns against
Linear Models
In the previous section, the total risk to the portfolios was measured by the
standard deviation to the returns. In this section, other risk factors will be
introduced. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the three-factor
model of Fama-French are used as benchmarks to evaluate the performances
of the merger arbitrage portfolios. Using these benchmarks will help identify
the inherent risk factors, and evaluate the excess return generated by merger
arbitrage when other risk factors are taken into consideration. The first part
of this section gives a short introduction to the CAPM and the Fama-French
model. The second part covers the methodology in modelling both bench-
marks. The last part will finish up by giving a short summary of the findings
of the analyses, and a conclusion.
8.1 CAPM and Fama-French as Benchmark
The CAPM model was developed by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Mossin
(1966). The model is popular and widely used because of the insight it offers,
and its accuracy is deemed acceptable for important applications (Bodie et al.
(2011)). One of the purposes of the CAPM is to provide a benchmark rate
of return for evaluating possible investments. Instead of using the total risk,
which is composed of systematic risk and unsystematic risk, the CAPM argues
that in a well-diversified portfolio the unsystematic risk will be diminished,
leaving the portfolio with mostly systematic risk. The systematic risk is the
risk that is attributable to market conditions, also called market risk. To
figure the level of market risk in a portfolio, one can measure the fluctuations
between the portfolio returns and the market returns. This correlation is given
in beta. If the portfolio returns move in line with the market, the beta will
equal to 1. A beta higher than 1 indicates that the portfolio returns fluctuates
more heavily than the market, and vice versa. A negative beta indicates that
the portfolio returns move in to opposite direction of the market. If the CAPM
theory holds, the beta value of the merger arbitrage portfolios should be able
to determine the expected returns of the portfolios. Returns obtained in excess
of what is predicted by the CAPM, will indicate that the portfolio is superior
to the market.
The Fama-French three-factor model is an extension of the CAPM model,
designed by Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (Fama and French (1993)). In
addition to the market risk in the CAPM model, Fama-French introduces two
more factors: a size factor denoted with SMB and a value factor denoted with
HML. SMB stands for Small Minus Big and represent returns of a portfolio
of small stocks in excess of the returns to a portfolio of large stocks. HML
stands for High Minus Low and represents the returns of a portfolio of stocks
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with a high book-to-market ratio in excess of the returns to a portfolio of stocks
with a low book-to-market ratio. Both size and value factors are valuable in
the analysis of risk factors of merger arbitrage portfolios. These factors have
on past evidence appeared to capture the risk premium well. βSMB and βHML
stand for the levels of correlation to the value- and size-factors respectively.
8.2 Modeling Linear Asset Pricing Models
The models of CAPM and Fama-French are both linear asset pricing models,
meaning that the models predict linear relationships between the merger ar-
bitrage portfolio returns and the market returns. In order to measure a linear
relationship, a regression analysis is performed for each merger arbitrage port-
folio. The monthly returns of each portfolio subtracted by risk free returns are
plotted in a scatter diagram against the market. The value weighted CRSP
index is still used as proxy for the total market. Computed by OLS (Ordinary
Least Squares) method, the diagram gives a best-fitted line through the plots.
The equation for this straight line is given as following:
rP − rf = αP + βP × (rM − rf ) + P
This equation is a revision of the CAPM formula. By subtracting the
risk free rate from the portfolio return, rP − rf , the regression line will plot
the size of the excess return, αP (alpha), in the intercept between the line and
the vertical axis. Positive αP will indicate that the portfolio outperformed the
market rM − rf during the time-period covered in this paper. αP equalling
zero will indicate that high portfolio returns are obtained through portfolios
bearing higher risks than the market. The slope of the line equals to the
portfolio beta βP . The error term P is the idiosyncratic risk which in the
CAPM model is assumed to equal zero.
To insure that all risk factors are accounted when evaluating the merger
arbitrage portfolios, there will also be performed a similar regression analysis
as above, but this time benchmarked to the Fama-French model. The size
and the value factors may then contribute in describing the high returns from
the merger arbitrage portfolios. The monthly returns from SMB index and
HML index used in the analysis are downloaded from the Kenneth R. French
homepage.21 The equation for this regression analysis is:
rP − rf = αP + βP × (rM − rf ) + βSMB × SMB + βHML ×HML+ P
The excess return, αP , is interpreted analogous to the CAPM model.
However, the different beta values in this equation cannot be depicted directly
from the diagram. Nevertheless, all the beta values show the level of correla-
tions between the portfolio returns and the indices of the market, the SMB
21http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
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and the HML.
8.3 Benchmarking Merger Arbitrage portfolios to linear mod-
els
Table 5: CAPM and Fama-French regression results
The table provides an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression of the annual excess return
from merger arbitrage against the CRSP index (Rm −Rf ), and the Fama-French factors
SMB and HML. For all of the factors, the statistical significance of the result is denoted
in the P − value columns.
Intercept Rm −Rf SMB HML
N R2 α (%) P − value β P − value β P − value β P − value
Cash Offers
Value Weighted
CAPM 156 0,21 -0,10 0,66 0,24 0,00
Fama-French 156 0,25 -0,27 0,26 0,24 0,00 0,03 0,72 0,20 0,01
Equal Weighted
CAPM 156 0,29 0,56 0,01 0,35 0,00
Fama-French 156 0,36 0,38 0,08 0,33 0,00 0,18 0,00 0,24 0,00
Stock Offers
Value Weighted
CAPM 156 0,00 0,96 0,06 -0,07 0,41
Fama-French 156 0,02 0,79 0,13 -0,10 0,25 0,19 0,24 0,24 0,13
Equal Weighted
CAPM 156 0,01 0,57 0,18 -0,10 0,26
Fama-French 156 0,03 0,77 0,08 -0,11 0,20 0,03 0,81 -0,24 0,07
Table 5 depicts an overview of the results from the regression analyses
of the four merger arbitrage portfolios benchmarked to the CAPM and the
Fama-French model.22 The results give divisive explanations to the different
portfolios. However, there are similarities in the portfolios of each category of
cash and stock. The reason to this is due to distinctive characteristics related
to the investments in cash deals and stock deals.
Comparing to the CAPM, all portfolios except from the value weighted
cash portfolio generated positive α during this period. Nevertheless, only
equal weighted cash portfolio and value weighted stock portfolio give statis-
tical significant results.23 The annual excess returns are 0.56% and 0.96% to
the equal weighted cash portfolio and value weighted stock portfolio respec-
tively. The other two portfolios reveal more random alphas, as the p-values
are relatively high, indicating insignificance. The beta values are quite low
for all portfolios. The reason for this is due to the fact that merger arbitrage
strategies implicate bets on deal completion. During a holding period between
announcement date and completion date, the target stock price movement is
mostly affected by the probability of deal outcomes. The risk related to mar-
ket is thus of minor importance. The market beta should therefore be small.
Both cash portfolios have significant low and positive beta values. Both stock
22Regression plots are depicted in the appendix.
23The equal weighted cash portfolio has significance at the 5% level, and value weighted
stock portfolio has significance at the 10% level
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portfolios, on the other hand, have slightly negative beta values. But these are
insignificant implied by the p-values. The R2 values for all portfolios suggest
that CAPM is not a reliable model in explaining the portfolios returns. R2
measures the proportion of variance in portfolio returns that is related to the
variance of market returns. Low R2 values imply that the returns are scattered
throughout the diagram, indicating that the best fitting straight line lead to
unstable αP and βP estimates (Bacon (2004)). However, cash portfolios have
significantly higher R2 values than the stock portfolios, 0.21 and 0.36 versus
values close to zero. Even though there are some portfolios that lack statis-
tical significance, both the value weighted stock and the equal weighted cash
portfolios generate significant αP .
Comparing to the Fama-French model, most of the results are quite
similar to the case of CAPM benchmark. According to this model all port-
folios still generate positive α, except from the value weighted cash portfolio.
However, only equal weighted portfolio of cash and stock are significant with
p-values below 10%. The annualised excess returns to these portfolios are re-
spectively 0.38% and 0.77%. The market beta values stay almost unaffected
with the new benchmark. The betas for size and value factors are all small but
significant, implying that both these factors may explain the portfolio returns
to some extent. The relevance of the size factor in cash portfolios is due to the
fact that cash is only feasible as payment for confined firm size.24 Therefore
cash portfolios mostly consist of smaller target firms, which increase the cor-
relation to the SMB factor. The relevance of value factors is due to mergers
and acquisitions being more likely to occur when the target is not overpriced
in the market, meaning that target firms often have high book-to-market val-
ues. Cash portfolios that only consist of target firms should therefore correlate
more to the HML factor. Including both size and value factors consistently
lead to a small increase in the R2 values for all merger arbitrage portfolios.
However, the R2 values are fairly low. The Fama-French model can proba-
bly not be considered as a good benchmark for evaluating merger arbitrage
portfolios.
To summarize the results presented in table 5, regardless of benchmark
method three of four portfolios gave positive α during this period. Only value
weighted cash portfolio fails to give positive alpha. The significance of the al-
pha values depends on the combination of portfolio and benchmark. However,
the equal weighted cash portfolio came out as a portfolio with significant αP
in both benchmarks. Low R2 values in all cases indicate that the liner asset
pricing models of CAPM and Fama-French are not reliable in explaining the
merger arbitrage portfolio returns during the time period between 2000 and
2012. This indication is also highlighted with quite low beta values for market
24As shown in figure 9, cash deals involve substantially smaller transactions.
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and for both added risk factors. To obtain more statistical support in the
models, an expansion of the event window including more monthly data may
improve the results. Nevertheless, increasing N will compromise the purpose
of this study, which is to analyse the development of merger arbitrage returns
in the years after the millennium. To draw a conclusion, the merger arbi-
trage strategy still beats the market. But due to the short time-window of the
research, only the equal weighted cash portfolio gives statistically significant
alpha.
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9 Benchmarking Merger arbitrage Returns against
a Non-linear Model
It is questionable if merger arbitrage portfolio performances should be bench-
marked against the CAPM and the Fama-French model. Both these linear
models assume that the portfolio returns and risks are linearly related to the
market. Measuring merger arbitrage portfolio returns against these models
implicitly makes the assumptions that the returns and risks are symmetric.25
This assumption could be rather problematic of two reasons. First, the pay-
off structure of merger arbitrage investments is asymmetric. Second, previous
studies claim that the merger arbitrage risks and returns are related to the
market in a non-linear way. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) suggests that a non-
linear model is a better benchmark for merger arbitrage portfolios.
The first part of this section will start by presenting the arguments for
the asymmetric pay-off structure of merger arbitrage portfolios. The next
part will test for non-linear relationship to market, and present a piecewise
linear model for benchmarking. The section will wrap up with a conclusion of
whether the merger arbitrage portfolio still is a superior investment strategy
when benchmarked to the piecewise linear model.
9.1 Asymmetric payoff
To fully understand the structure of merger arbitrage returns, it is useful to
have a closer look at the returns obtained by cash deals. Cash deals are the
simplest form for merger and acquisition transaction. It is therefore more
informative to focus on analyzing cash deals in this section.
A cash deal involves the arbitrageur taking a long position in the target
stock after an announcement. The opportunity for an upside return from this
position is fixed to the arbitrage spread. Since the arbitrageur is supposed to
hold the long position in the target stock until the completion date, the stock
price would normally not raise above the bid price.26 The bid price can thus
be seen as a cap for the return. On the other hand, the downside for holding
the position until completion date is uncertain and can be significantly larger
than the upside. In most cases, the stock price will fall to its initial price prior
to the announcement if the deal fails to complete. But in theory the stock
price has no limit on the downside.
With a limited upside and an unlimited downside, the return distribution
is asymmetric. This is a violation on the “random walk” assumption which is
an essential assumption in the linear models. The violation is also the main
argument for why linear models may not be able to capture the risk-reward
25Symmetric return means that future stock price follows a random walk, i.e. the proba-
bility distribution of return is bell-shaped
26In some cases the stock price do raise above the bid price, if the market expect that the
target firm will get higher bids in the near future.
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relationship in merger arbitrage portfolios.
Some studies like Bhagat et al. (1987) suggest that option pricing models
are a better suited for analysing merger arbitrage returns. Taking a long
position in a target stock during a deal is quite similar to holding a short
position in a European put option with the target stock as the underlying
asset. This is illustrated in Figure 14. According to the study of Mitchell
and Pulvino (2001) holding a merger arbitrage portfolio is akin to writing
uncovered index put options. The European aspect of the option comes from
the fact that the merger arbitrage bet includes holding a position until deal
completion. The option can therefore only be exercised on the expiration date,
which equals to the completion date. The strike price equals to the announced
bid price, which make the cap on the pay-off structure. The intercept between
the pay-off line and the horizontal axis illustrates the current stock price. The
current stock price is lower than the strike price, meaning that the put option
is in-the-money. The arbitrageur can however not yet earn the option premium
by striking, due to the option being European.
Figure 14: Payoff Structure
The return from holding a merger arbitrage position is determined by
the arbitrage spread. The idiosyncratic risk related to this position is coming
from exogenous factors, which affect the process of the deal. Because of the
asymmetric pay-off structure related to merger arbitrage portfolios, it is then
questionable whether the performance of the overall stock market even is re-
lated to merger arbitrage returns at all. Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) claim
that non-linear models are better benchmarks for evaluation of merger arbi-
trage portfolios. In the next part of this section, a non-linear model will be
introduced.
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9.2 Correlation in different market conditions
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) claimed that in a flat and appreciating market
there is no correlation between merger arbitrage portfolio returns and market
returns. However, in a market downturn, market sentiments will have nega-
tive impacts on deal outcomes, suggesting positive correlation between merger
arbitrage returns and market returns. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that
the effect of positive correlation in a market downturn can be explained by
the investor risk-averse behaviours. Even though the arbitrageurs are familiar
with the reward and risk related to the merger arbitrage investments, their
investors may not be. Consequently, the investors may redeem their capital in
a downturn market when the arbitrageur may need it the most. This may lead
to negative returns in the merger arbitrage portfolio. In order to see if this ar-
gument for a varying correlation still holds for the time-period in this paper,
there will be performed linear regression analyses in two different economic
stages. Both cash portfolios will be benchmarked to the CAPM model.27 The
appreciating market is defined as a condition where the market excess return
to the risk free rate is 2%, and the depreciating market has an market ex-
cess return to the risk free rate of -2%. The thresholds for different market
conditions are sat arbitrarily. The only purpose is to make a clear distinction
between the two stages.
Table 6: Merger Arbitrage during different market conditions
Intercept Rm −Rf
N R2 α (%) P − value β P − value
Value Weighted
Up Market (Rm −Rf > 2%) 63 0,02 0,7 0,39 0,13 0,24
Down Market (Rm −Rf < −2%) 47 0,17 0,5 0,56 0,34 0,00
Equal Weighted
Up Market (Rm −Rf > 2%) 63 0,07 0,7 0,36 0,23 0,04
Down Market (Rm −Rf < −2%) 47 0,40 1,5 0,02 0,44 0,00
The results from table 6 indicates the correlation between the portfolio
returns and the market returns varies in different market conditions.28 In an
appreciating market the correlation is limited. The beta β is close to zero.
But in a depressed market, the correlation is slightly positive. The beta β for
depressed markets are also highly significant with low p-values. These find-
ings are consistent with the report of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), suggesting
that the relationship between risk arbitrage returns of cash portfolios and the
market returns is non-linear.
27The stock portfolios will not be included in this analysis due to the complexity of the
hedge position in stock deals.
28Regression plots are depicted in the appendix
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9.3 Piecewise Linear Function
Figure 15: Piecewise Linear Model, Mitchell and Pulvino (2001)
This is a illustration of how a piecewise linear model might represent returns from merger
arbitrage in a more accurate manner. In normal and flat markets βMktHigh is relatively
flat, while in falling markets the βMktHigh increases. Note the threshold assumption
connecting the two regression lines.
To asses the level of non-linearity, this paper addresses a method analogous
to the Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), conducting a piecewise linear regression
analysis for the cash portfolios. The piecewise linear model is an expansion of
the CAPM model. Instead of testing for correlation with only one beta, two
betas are created to capture correlation in different economic stages. This is
illustrated in Figure 15. The first beta (βMktLow) represents the fluctuation in
portfolio returns compared to a downturn market, the second beta (βMktHigh)
represents the fluctuations in portfolio returns compared to a flat or appreci-
ating market. The main difference between the piecewise linear model and the
previous analysis, is that the piecewise model insure continuity in the model.
Both linear pieces of the model should be connected. The formula for the
piecewise linear model is presented as following:
Rp −Rf = (1− δ)[αDown + βDown(RM −Rf )] + δ[αUp + βUp(RM −Rf )]
δ is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the market excess return
is above a threshold level, and zero otherwise. The threshold is a given point
in the piecewise model which distinguish between a depressed market and a
flat or appreciating market. This level is determined by computing for the
excess market return which minimizes Sum of Squared Errors (SSE) of both
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lines in the regression analysis. Minimizing the SSE will give the best fitted
piecewise line to the given scatter plots. Similar to the methodology performed
by Mitchell and Pulvino (2001), the following restriction is imposed on the
piecewise linear model, making the linear pieces connect:
αDown + βDown(Threshold) = αUp + βUp(Threshold)
Table 7 reveals that the restrictions in the piecewise models resulted in
thresholds of 0% and 1.4% for respectively value weighted and equal weighted
cash portfolios.29 While 0% seems to be an acceptable distinction point be-
tween two market conditions, a threshold of 1.4% seems to be a quite high
limit for a depressed market. The table also shows that both alpha and beta
for up- and down-market are quite similar. This applies for both cash portfo-
lios. By creating a continuing piecewise line consisting of two best fitted line,
the model erased the clear distinction between the beta of different market
conditions which were found earlier. The p-values of the betas also suggests
significant estimates. The findings indicates that the piecewise model for the
time-period between 2000 and 2012 may not be much different to the original
CAPM model.
Table 7: Piecewise Linear Regression
Intercept Rm −Rf
Threshold (%) R2 α (%) P − value β P − value
Value Weighted
Up market 0,00 0,09 0,01 0,98 0,35 0,00
Down market 0,00 0,14 0,00 1,00 0,33 0,00
Piecewise Linear Model Total 0,23
Equal Weighted
Up market 1,40 0,10 -0,02 0,99 0,48 0,01
Down market 1,40 0,29 0,56 0,04 0,34 0,00
Piecewise Linear Model Total 0,39
To check if there is evidence for a piecewise linear model, a t-test is con-
ducted. The test aims to validate if the piecewise linear model is significantly
different from a straight line:
αDown 6= αUp
βDown 6= βUp
In both portfolios the t-test fails to reject that there are significant differences
between the parameters of appreciating and depreciating markets.30 The data
show no evidence supporting a piecewise linear model. This suggests that
it is not different from the original CAPM model, and should therefore not
29Regression plots are depicted in the appendix
30See appendix for detailed t-test results.
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be used as a benchmark for recent merger arbitrage portfolio performance.
This is contradictory to the conclusions of Mitchell and Pulvino (2001). An
explanation of the differing results is due to changing time period. The study
of Mitchell and Pulvino included data in the time period of 1986 to 1997,
while this paper contains more recent data from 2000 to 2012. A different
time series combined with limited dataset can also be the reason for lack of
significant results in the regression analysis.
To summarize this section, the paper addresses characteristics to the
merger arbitrage portfolio returns which make it difficult to evaluate. With
an asymmetric pay-off structure, the linear asset pricing models are not able
to capture the risk-reward relationship in the portfolios. Previous studies have
argued for using a piecewise linear model as benchmark model in such cases.
However, the data from 2000 to 2012 cannot validate any difference between
the suggested piecewise linear model and the original CAPM model. In ad-
dition to low explanation power, R2, this paper concluded that the piecewise
model is not applicable as benchmark. The estimated alpha values derived
from this model can therefore not be used.
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This paper reinforces that merger arbitrage still is a superior investment strat-
egy providing excess returns. However, approving this fact does not necessarily
compromise the fundamental theory of efficient financial markets. Merger ar-
bitrage returns are obtained by the arbitrageur taking large risks, which the
average investor does not want to carry. Much of the returns gained by the
arbitrageurs can be explained by their role in mergers and acquisitions trans-
actions.
In total four merger arbitrage portfolios are presented in this paper;
value weighted and equal weighted portfolios of both cash and stock. By using
time-series approach, the portfolio performances are measured during the time
period from 2000 to 2012. The portfolio performances are benchmarked to
the market returns. The results reveal that all portfolios outperformed the
market on average in this period. The value weighted portfolios of cash and
stock showed average annual returns of respectively 2.08% and 12.51%, and
the equal weighted portfolios had annual returns of respectively 9.34% and
7.77%. It is worth noting however, that this study ignores transaction costs
which might affect the magnitude of abnormal returns. The market, on the
other hand, provided a annual return of barely 0.59%. The market returns
from this period is very low compared to results presented in previous studies.
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) found returns in the magnitude of 6.22% over
the period from 1963 to 1998. The substantial decrease in returns in this
paper is probably due to the fact that the market has been through two severe
recessions during this period. In hindsight the average investor would have
been better off putting all the money in the bank rather than investing in the
market.
All portfolios still outperformed the market when adjusting for market
risk by using the performance indicators Sharpe ratio and M2. To evaluate for
other risk factors, the portfolios are benchmarked to linear models of CAPM
and Fama-French. According to CAPM, all portfolios, except from the value
weighted cash portfolio, generated positive excess return. The equal weighted
cash portfolio displayed significant excess returns of 0.56% annually. Other
portfolios still reveals excess returns, but is less supported by statistical sig-
nificance. Similar results are presented when benchmarked to Fama-French,
with an increased statistical explanation power.
Due to the asymmetric pay-off structure in merger arbitrage, Mitchell
and Pulvino (2001) claimed that non-linear models are better benchmarks
for the evaluation of merger arbitrage returns. This paper built a piecewise
linear model to investigate this alternative approach to performance testing of
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merger arbitrage. Nevertheless, the results could not confirm such a non-linear
relationship. The t-test performed in this paper reject the existence of any
significant differences between linear and non-linear models for recent data
from 2000 to 2012.
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This paper as well as many others has tried to show that merger arbitrage
is a profitable investment strategy, not only for the arbitrageurs who pick
transactions carefully but also on average as a passive strategy. After reviewing
the evidence of past academic work and conducting similar research on the
topic it is possible to state with a certain degree of confidence that merger
arbitrage has given excess return to investors. In a slight departure from
the pure academics of this paper the following section provides a look at the
possibilities for private investors to get a share of these profits.
Merger arbitrage was for a long time reserved a small group of elite pro-
fessional investors on Wall Street. In his book Risk Arbitrage Guy P. Wyser-
Pratte accounts for the community of risk arbitrageurs: “The big money mak-
ers of Wall Street often mask their expertise in mystery, and among them the
most mysterious is a cliquish band of specialists known as arbitrageurs. One
member of the New York Stock Exchange says: “I think of them as vague
shadows with European backgrounds. I dont even know who they are.””
Wyser-Pratte (2009) states that almost up until the 1970s very few,
even investment professionals, knew about the profits generated from merger
arbitrage. This changed in the takeover rush of the 1980s when Ivan Boesky
and other arbitrageurs made huge profits from the practice and started get-
ting international recognition and Forbes magazine covers. Several investment
firms opened their own merger arbitrage desks during this period, but most
of them lacked the insight and skill to produce much profit from this. It was
not until the 1990s with the establishment of a large hedge fund industry that
this form of investing again became popular. However; hedge funds are no-
toriously secretive and investing in them requires a professional network and
large amounts of capital and expertise.
The possibility for private investors to get in on merger arbitrage has
until very recently been practically impossible. This has changed however;
with the introduction of exchange traded funds (ETFs). ETFs are exchange
traded shares of a highly diverse class of funds, it is basically an investment
fund traded on the stock market. ETFs are set up to closely match the value of
an index that it is tracking. It takes away the capital requirements of investing
in large capital funds, hedge funds or virtually any other investment strategy
imaginable. It is possible to simply buy shares in the indices that track these
alternatives at very low transaction costs. There are several merger arbitrage
indices on the market that constructs merger arbitrage portfolios. Table 8 has
an overview of the most commonly known merger arbitrage indices.
They all follow quite similar methodologies; they track a given set of
countries and when an acquisition of a specified size occurs they include the
target stock, plus a short on acquirer stock in stock deals, in the index. E.g.
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Table 8: Merger Arbitrage Indices
Index provider Index Ticker Equity markets Starting year
Standard & Poors (S&P) Merger Arbitrage Index SPLSAUP All developed countries 2005
Credit Suisse Merger Arbitrage Liquid Index CSMEARL North America & Europe 1998
IndexIQ Merger Arbitrage Index IQMNA All developed countries 2007
Hennessee Group Merger Arbitrage Index HENMGAR US 1993
the S&P Merger Arbitrage Index has at any given time a maximum of 40 stocks
currently in merger deals and it tracks both cash and stock deals. The deal
size must be above $500 million, there are liquidity possibility requirements
and it must be possible to short the acquirer stock. The central properties of
these indices are that they exhibit market neutral characteristics, low volatility
and low correlation with the market index. These are shared properties of the
merger portfolios in this paper.
For private investors it is then a matter of finding ETFs that track
these indices to invest in merger arbitrage, in a way to become arbitrageurs
themselves. Table 9 presents an overview of ETFs that track the merger
arbitrage indices.
Table 9: Merger Arbitrage ETFs
ETF provider ETF Tracked index Ticker
Credit Suisse Merger Arbitrage Index Leveraged ETN Credit Suisse Merger Arbitrage Liquid Index CSMB
IndexIQ IQ Merger Arbitrage ETF IndexIQ Merger Arbitrage Index MNA
ProShares Merger ETF S&P Merger Arbitrage Index MRGR
If a private investor were to invest in a merger arbitrage ETF the expec-
tation would be to earn excess returns when adjusting for risk. If one looks
at the development of the Credit Suisse Merger Arbitrage Index compared to
the S&P 500 composite index one can see how the ETF investment would typ-
ically perform. Figure 16 illustrates the difference between a typical merger
arbitrage index and the average investor represented by the S& P 500.
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Figure 16: S& P 500 and Credit Suisse Merger Arbitrage Index
The index has lower volatility and a much steadier development than
the S& P 500, and would diversify any portfolio in terms of risk. These ETFs
are easily available for investing through the normal trading platforms like
Nordnet and Netfonds, making the once elusive “dark arts” of arbitrageurs
available for average investors.
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Appendix
A Calculations
Compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
The compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is the geometrical average
return across all years. The formula to calculate CAGR is:
CAGR = (1 +RMonth)
12 − 1
Standard Deviation
Portfolio risk is defined as uncertainty in expected returns. This is measured
with the historical variability in the portfolio returns which deviate from the
mean. Standard deviation is used to calculate variability. A high standard
deviation indicates high uncertainty. The formula for standard deviation is
shown in the following equation:
σMonthly =
√√√√√√
i=n∑
i=1
(ri − rmean)2
N
Usually, the sample standard deviation formula contains n-1 in the
denominator. However, the adjustment of -1 is negligible if the data sample
is large. In this case, there are 144 months data-points, which should be
sufficient for an approximately estimation. Since the portfolio returns are
presented in annual terms, the monthly standard deviation is multiplied with
the square root of 12, which is the number of monthly observations in a year:
σAnnual = σMonthly ×
√
12
Sharpe Ratio (SR):
SR =
RPortfolio −Rf
σPortfolio
The risk free rate Rf is estimated using the U.S 3-month Treasury Bill
downloaded from Kenneth R. French’s homepage.
Modigliani’s Performance Measure M2
M2 = (SRPortfolio − SRMarket)× σMarket
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the CAPM
Figure A.1: Value weighted cash portfolio
Figure A.2: Equal weighted cash portfolio
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Figure A.3: Value weighted stock portfolio
Figure A.4: Equal weighted stock portfolio
Benchmarking all four merger arbitrage portfolios to the CAPM
The figure shows clear differences between cash and stock portfolios. While
both cash portfolios seem to have a positive correlation to the market, the
stock portfolios are almost not correlated to the market at all. All portfolios
generate positive alpha, except from the value weighted cash portfolio. The
low explanation power, R2, to all portfolios suggests that the CAPM is not a
good benchmark model for explaining the portfolio returns.
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C CAPM over changing market cycles
Figure A.5: Value weighted cash portfolio
Figure A.6: Equal weighted cash portfolio
CAPM - Up Market and Down Market:
These figures illustrates the performances of the cash portfolios benchmarked
to the CAPM in an appreciating market and a depreciating market. A
appreciating market is defined as a condition where the market excess return
to the risk free rate is 2%, and a depreciating market has an excess return to
the risk free rate of -2%.
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Figure A.7: Piecewise linear value weighted cash
Figure A.8: Piecewise linear equal weighted cash
Merger arbitrage portfolios benchmarked to the piecewise linear
model:
This figure plots the portfolios excess returns against the market excess
returns. Both panels use the piecewise linear model as benchmark. Panel A
and Panel B depict the performances of the respectively value weighted and
equal weighted cash portfolio. The threshold which minimizes the SSE in
Panel A is 0%, and 1.4% for Panel B.
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E T-test: Validating if there is evidence for a
piecewise relationship
Table A.1: T-test
Coeffisient P-value Std.dev. Lower 95% Upper 95%
Value Weighted
UP
Alpha 0,01 % 0,9808 0,50 % -0,98 % 1,00 %
Beta 0,3483 0,0045 0,1192 0,1112 0,5853
DOWN
Alpha 0,00 % 0,9953 0,55 % -1,11 % 1,10 %
Beta 0,3304 0,0014 0,0990 0,1327 0,5281
Equal Weighted
UP
Alpha -0,02 % 0,9856 0,87 % -1,76 % 1,73 %
Beta 0,4763 0,0108 0,1813 0,1140 0,8386
DOWN
Alpha 0,56 % 0,0426 0,27 % 0,02 % 1,10 %
Beta 0,3360 0,0000 0,0560 0,2247 0,4473
Figure A.9: T-test: Value weighted
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Figure A.10: T-test: equal weighted
A t-test is conducted to validate if there is evidence supporting the piecewise
model:
αDown 6= αUp
βDown 6= βUp
The t-test reveals that both the estimated alpha values for the value
weighted portfolio in up and down markets are insignificant, with p-values
well above 95%. There is therefore not sufficient evidence supporting that
the alpha values are different from zero. This alone does not provide any
conclusive results for the piecewise model. The t-test indicate that the value
weighted portfolio has significant beta values of respectively 0.35 and 0.33 for
Up and Down market. However, the t-test shows that the betas are not
significantly different from each other. Both beta values are set in between
the 95% confidence interval of each other, indicating that the betas may have
the same values. Summarized, there is no evidence supporting the piecewise
linear model for the value weighted portfolio. With equal beta values and no
validation on different alpha values, the result indicates that the piecewise
model is similar to the CAPM model.
The results are almost the same for the equal weighted portfolio. The alpha
for up market has p-values making it statistically insignificant. However, the
alpha for down market is highly significant. The results make it difficult to
validate whether both these values are equal or not. Both beta values at 0.47
and 0.33 for the equal weighted portfolio are significantly positive, but there
is no evidence supporting that both these values are statistically different.
Figure A.10 show that the beta for the down market lies within the
significant limits of the beta for the up market, therefore they are
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statistically similar. The conclusion of this test is that the piecewise model
can not be confirmed in this case either.
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